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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction
 
1 Outline of the dissertation
Corporations face two crucial nancial questions: What investments should the rm
make? And how should it nance those investments? The rst involves spending money,
the second involves raising money. Therefore, raising capital is the lifeline of any corpo-
ration, and the e¢ ciency of allocating various sources of external capital is an important
determinant of the rms cost of capital. The focus of this thesis is on the supply-side
e¤ects of corporate nance. When rms are able to obtain the needed capital more
easily, this can stimulate investment and economic growth. It is well understood that a
developed banking system improves economic growth (Levine and Servos (1998)).
Banks serve two main purposes: they act as delegated monitors and provide liquidity.
The role of delegated monitor has been created to attenuate the problem of asymmetric
information. This improves resource allocation and economic activity. Through this
mechanism, e¢ cient bank markets have a positive e¤ect on economic growth. Modigliani
and Miller (1958) show that in an Arrow-Debreu world without frictions such as taxes
or asymmetric information, it doesnt matter how external capital is raised. In other
words, the size of the pie is una¤ected by the way it is sliced. This result started a
whole literature which relaxes the stringent Arrow-Debreu assumptions. We contribute
to this literature by investigating the impact of relaxing the following assumptions of
perfect competition an symmetric information in nancial markets. As European rms
are still heavily dependent on bank loans for their external nance (ECB (2007)), the
focus of this dissertation is on banks as providers of external nance. Alternative sources
for external nance besides bank loans have also developed over the last decade. The
introduction of the Euro has helped to create a truly European bond market. However,
issuing bonds has long been the privilege of (very) large rms. The percentage of rms
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issuing a bond is only 14.2%. The median rm that issue bonds has total assets of e
1,251.45 million whereas the median rm in the sample has total assets of e 136.58
million.
Following the second banking directive of 1989, the European banking markets have
been exposed to a wave of mostly domestic mergers and acquisitions. As a result, half
of the European countries have now a banking market which is characterized by 5
large banks taking at least 60% of the market share, a textbook case of an oligopoly.
Moreover, the nancial crisis changes the bank market structure as mergers and ac-
quisitions are approved by regulators which would likely not pass the bar in normal
times on grounds of anti-trust issues. An example is the takeover of Halifax Bank of
Scotland by Lloyds TSB. This takeover will increase the concentration in the British
banking market by 8.3%. An important aspect of an oligopoly is that companies can
behave strategically. When there is perfect competition, everyone is a price taker as no
company is large enough to set the price. However, when there are a small number of
companies, they can start to (tacitly) cooperate to the detriment of their customers.
The rst two chapters investigate whether the bank market structure of the European
banking markets leave the banks scope to set the prices and/or quantities of loans which
are worse for costumers than in the case of perfect competition. In the rst chapter, we
examine the capital structure of non-nancial listed companies. In the second chapter,
we investigate the loan characteristics in the syndicated loan market.
Another implication of the Second Banking Directive of 1989 is that it contains
provisions allowing all banks to pursue strategies leading to a German-style universal
bank. Banks can hold equity stakes in non-nancial rms, be they subject to certain
regulatory limits. As banks can exploit both their information obtained from lending
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to a rm as well as from being a shareholder it has a potential advantage over the
average shareholder. Furthermore, institutional investors such as mutual funds and
pension funds have become more important as owners of corporate equity. Institutional
investments in world equity markets have grown substantially in recent decades to
such a degree that nancial institutions have emerged as the largest investor class in
many countries (IMF 2005). Therefore, we examine in chapter 3 the impact of banks
as shareholders of non-nancial companies.
The nal chapter investigates the impact of bank regulation and oversight on bank
liquidity provision. We focus in particular on the requirements that the regulators set
with regard to bank capital. The banking market is a heavily regulated industry due
to state guarantees such as deposit insurance. Moreover, the nancial crisis has made
the importance of regulation very clear as it fuels a whole new wave of proposals such
as the Larosière report and the "Volcker Rule". The di¤erence between Europe and the
U.S. appears to be an emphasis on macro-prudential regulation in the former while the
stress is more on micro-tuning of the banking sector in the latter. The Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) released, in 2004, the new Basel Capital Accord (Basel
II). One of the central changes proposed by Basel II is that assets have be marked-to-
market instead of marked-to-book. The banks have criticized the mark-to-market rule
which lead to the following quote by Warren Bu¤et "In one way, Im sympathetic to the
institutional reluctance to face the music. Id give a lot to mark my weight to model
rather than to market." (Fortune, 8/16/07). However, a consultation round for a new
Basel Capital Accord was initiated by the BCBS in December 2009.
Since August 2007, we have witnessed the most severe nancial crisis since the Great
Depression of the 1930s. Due to large surpluses on the current accounts of China and
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large decits on the current accounts of the U.S., China invested in the U.S. in trea-
sury bills from the U.S. This demand for treasury bills led to a very low interest rate
on these bills. This very low yield caused the search of institutional investors for new
products with higher yields but the same low risk as treasury bills. The names of these
products are all too familiar: the most mentioned are Collateral Debt Obligations and
Asset Backed Securities. The consensus on the start of the crisis is that banks who
created these sophisticated products assessed the risk wrongly. The assumption that
housing prices would decline was not stress tested and when this decline eventually
occurred the losses were dramatic. The nancial crisis has shown the importance of
nancial stability and the dangers of systemic risk. The problems of asymmetric in-
formation between the banks were so high that the inter-bank market all but dried
up. Massive liquidity injections of the central banks were needed to keep the nancial
system aoat. Additionally, many governments had to step in and rescue several banks,
creating huge nancial burdens for their citizens. Moreover, banks play a critical role
during periods of nancial crisis because they are highly leveraged and regulated in-
stitutions. To maintain their capital ratios after experiencing a large negative capital
shock, they must signicantly shrink assets, which in turn tends to amplify the e¤ects
of economic shocks. Thus, the growing acceptance among investors that banks need
to recapitalize led the crisis to deepen further and rendered it more di¢ cult for policy
makers to maintain macroeconomic stability.
2 Bank competition
In the second chapter, we investigate whether the market structures of European bank
markets a¤ect the access of non-nancial rms to bank nance. More specically, we
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empirically examine the relationship between the degree of concentration of European
bank markets and the capital structure of non-nancial rms. To make it more tangible,
imagine two identical rms in all but one thing, their location. One rm is situated in
Belgium, a very concentrated banking market, and the other rm is located in Germany,
a much less concentrated banking market. The standard view in industrial organization
is that concentration can lead to market power. In our case, when there are few banks
competing in an industry, it is easier for them to collaborate which can be detrimental
to rms. Firms in the more concentrated banking market would be more restricted
to obtain external nance which would be reected in their capital structure. As a
result, they would have less external capital and therefore less leverage. However, a
large banking literature has shown that the reverse might hold true. A larger, more
concentrated banking industry can produce relationship improvements between the
banks and the borrowers. These banks have more information and can therefore better
assess which rms should be given a loan. Overall, the results lend empirical support
to the market power hypothesis which states that more concentrated bank markets
lead to more market power for the banks and less bank nancing. A negative and
signicant relationship between the degree of concentration of European bank markets
and the market leverage of non-nancial rms is found. Since the mean level of bank
market concentration across the countries is 0.061 and the 75th percentile is 0.109, a
change from the mean to the 75th percentile would mean a drop in rm leverage of
4.3%. When bank market concentration variables are substituted for indicators of bank
competition based on the observed behavior of banks, the results remain unaltered.
An increase from the mean to the 75th percentile of CR5, the Lerner Index or the
Boone Indicator leads to a respective decrease in leverage of 8.0%, 7.1% and 3.5%.
Since endogeneity of bank market structure, alternative sources of external nance
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and the rm-specic factors driving the demand for leverage are controlled for, these
ndings reect a supply-side e¤ect. Thus, the ongoing consolidation of bank markets
may impose an external debt nance constraint on non-nancial rms. However, rms
with e¤ective access to the bond market are not constrained in their choice of leverage,
stressing the importance of alternatives to bank nancing. The results imply that the
ongoing (domestic) consolidation of the banking industry in Europe can potentially
hamper the access of rms to bank nancing. This calls for renewed e¤orts to increase
the contestability and integration of bank lending markets in Europe.
In chapter three, we focus on a specic market, namely the syndicated loan market
where we use loans up to 29 January 2010. Syndicated loans are large loans that are
provided by a group of (investment) banks - the syndicate - to a single borrower.
Syndicated loans are a hybrid form of private and public debt. Like standard bank loans,
they are much more exible than public debt placements and are often tailored to the
borrowers needs. Like bond issues, they can raise very substantial volumes of funds, and
are placed among a potentially large number of institutions at harmonized conditions
for all. In contrast to a traditional bank loan, which involves a relationship between a
borrower and a single lender, a syndicated loan is originated by a "lead bank" which sells
pieces of the loan to other (participant) banks. Before and after the syndication, the lead
bank acts as an agent for the lending syndicate in collecting and processing information
about the borrower. The lead arranger conducts due diligence on the borrower and
signs a preliminary loan agreement ("mandate") with the borrowing rm that species
covenants, fees and collateral. Once the preliminary loan agreement is signed, the lead
arranger then turns to potential participant lenders to fund part of the loan. Each
participant is responsible for a share of the loan and the terms of the loan are identical
for all syndicate members. In addition to interest and commitment fee income, the lead
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arranger receives a fee for arranging and managing the syndicated loan, which is paid
by the borrowing rm. During the life of the loan, the lead arranger typically also acts
as the agentbank that monitors the rm, governs the terms of the loan, administers
the drawdown of funds, calculates interest payments, and enforces nancial covenants.
A signicant home bias has been documented in the syndicated loan market, indicating
that large rms are dependent on their national banking market. Moreover, the overall
European banking market is still far from integrated. The ndings above suggest that
bank market structure may explain some of the variation in bank loan characteristics
of large listed rms. Results show that more concentrated banking markets decrease
loan spreads, but have no e¤ect on loan size or loan maturity. The price e¤ect is both
statistically and economically signicant. The average loan spread will decrease by
about 23 basis points if a borrower moves from a country in the sample with the lowest
banking concentration to a country with the highest banking concentration, all else
equal. When we use alternative measures of bank market structure such as CR5 and
the Boone Indicator the loan spread decrease by 10.1 and 14.6 basis points respectively
going from the minimum to the maximum. We also examine loans o¤ered to rms
during the nancial crisis period. We nd that banks respond by turning to large loans
and increasing loan spreads. We nd that the increase in loan spreads since the crisis
is relatively higher for rms in countries with more concentrated banking markets. The
results draw a more nuanced picture. The previous chapter nds a negative e¤ect of
more concentrated bank markets while this chapter nds that more concentrated bank
markets lead to lower spreads and no e¤ect on volume. Nevertheless, in the previous
chapter the result is dependent on the size of the borrower. The companies in the largest
quartile are found to be not a¤ected by bank market structure in chapter 2. This chapter
adds information for this subsample of companies showing the positive impact of bank
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market structure for these large rms and shows that a more concentrated bank market
worsens the lending conditions during a crisis. The policy implications therefore remain
to increase the contestability and integration of bank lending markets in Europe.
3 Bank Ownership
In chapter four, we investigate whether or not banks play a positive role in the
ownership structure of European listed rms. This is a topical issue since the nancial
crisis raises questions about the optimal scope of banking. Should the role of banks be
restricted to nancial intermediation or do banks also have a role to play as shareholders
of non-nancial corporations? We examine the relationship between bank ownership
and the performance of the rms in which they act as shareholders. Research in the
1980s and 1990s concluded that German and Japanese rms beneted from the active
involvement of their main bank in their corporate governance. This was part of the
rationale for the deregulation of the banking systems in Europe. Therefore, we make a
distinction between banks and other institutional investors as shareholders for a large
sample of listed European rms. Banks, and the bank trusts they manage, are treated
as a separate group next to institutional investors, such as mutual funds, pension funds
trusts, private equity rms, nancial companies and insurance companies. Banks can
hold both debt and equity in corporations. This combination may give banks additional
power in the disciplining of corporate management. Institutional investors can only use
the powers attached to their equity stakes to exert inuence. In the empirical set-up of
the paper three relationships are explored simultaneously. The rst is the link between
the ownership structure of rms and their performance, measured as the Tobins Q.
The second is the relationship between ownership and the rm-specic or institutional
10
determinants. Since leverage may serve as a disciplining device, a third association is
that between the observed leverage of a rm and its ownership structure, obviously
with a special focus on banks, since they can hold both debt and equity. Hence, we
tackle the following questions. What are the determinants of bank and institutional
investor ownership in non-nancial rms? What is the e¤ect on the long-run corporate
performance of bank versus institutional investor ownership? What are the interactions
between ownership, leverage and performance. The main results can be summarized
as follows. First, nancial institutions, both bank and non-banks, typically hold equity
stakes in large, cash rich and widely held rms which are moreover characterized by
high dividend yield and a lower than average investment risk, measured as the volatility
of the weekly stock market returns. The preference for dividends and low-risk stocks is
most pronounced for institutional investors. We interpret these ndings as evidence that
nancial institutions behave like typical investors, seeking return rather than inuence.
Second, after controlling for the capital structure decision of the rms and the ownership
decision of nancial institutions in a simultaneous equations model, we nd that there
is a negative relationship between nancial institution ownership and the market value
of rms, measured as the Tobins Q. This negative value e¤ect holds for banks as well as
institutional investors. This is in sharp contradiction with the monitoring hypothesis.
The ndings reveal no evidence that banks, which can use both debt and equity as
potential monitoring instruments, as well as institutional shareholders, are e¤ective
monitors of corporate management. This questions their role as shareholders. Third,
although the presence of nancial institutions in the ownership structure of rms is
associated with higher levels of leverage, this feature does not function as an e¤ective
disciplining device for managers. Instead we nd a negative association between leverage
and the market value of rms. Over the sample period, banks have reduced their equity
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holdings in non-nancial rms. Given the results, this seems to be socially optimal. The
nancial crisis forces banks and regulators to review the scope of banking franchises.
It might be advisable to restrict banks in their holdings of equity of non-nancial
rms. Banks should focus on intermediation and not combine lending and equity stakes,
because this may create conicts of interest. Institutional investors have become more
important than shareholders. Yet the results indicate that their value added in terms
of creating shareholder value is limited. This may have di¤erent reasons. One plausible
explanation could be that most institutional investors, such as mutual funds and pension
funds, have duciary duties to their own investors and typically track large stocks in
widely used stock market indices. This would imply that they merely act as investors
and do not seek to monitor or inuence corporate managers. In order to provoke a
more active stance as shareholder this class of owners should use their voting rights
more actively.
4 Liquidity
In the nal chapter, we examine the impact of bank regulation and supervision on
bank liquidity provision. As one of the main reasons for the existence of banks besides
delegated monitoring is the role they play as liquidity providers, it is important to
understand how bank regulation and supervision a¤ects the liquidity provision behav-
ior of banks. The valuation under Basel II (mark-to-market) increases the sensitivity
of a banks capital requirement to the risk of its assets and may accentuate the pro-
cyclical tendencies of banking. During a recession, bank borrowers are downgraded by
the credit risk models in use, minimum bank capital requirements will increase. To the
extent that it is di¢ cult or costly for banks to raise external capital in bad times, this
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co-movement in bank capital requirements and the business cycle may induce banks to
further reduce lending during recessions, thereby amplifying the initial downturn. We
investigate the e¤ect of bank regulation on a specic measure of bank liquidity exposure
in the syndicated loan market. The new proposed regulations and regulatory bodies,
due to the current nancial crisis, stress the timeliness and importance of our research
question. We use indicators for the oversight of bank capital, power of the regulators,
restrictions on bank activities, the independence of the supervisory authority and diver-
sication of bank activities. When we compare the banks in the top quartile of liquidity
exposure to those in the bottom quartile, the former have weaker oversight of bank
capital, more restrictions on their activities, a more powerful and more independent
supervisory authority and less diversication of bank activities than the latter. The
regressions show that stronger bank capital oversight is associated with lower liquidity
provision. This e¤ect is economically important as a bank from the bottom quartile of
capital oversight gives 17.7% more liquidity than a bank from a country with capital
restrictions from the top quartile, everything else equal. Moreover, we nd that the
share of retail deposits over total deposits has a signicant positive impact on bank liq-
uidity. Interestingly, the coe¢ cient is higher for lead banks than for participant banks
suggesting that the advantage of retail deposits is larger for lead banks. The current
nancial crisis raises the additional question of how bank liquidity creation responds
during crises. While the crisis has a signicant negative impact on bank liquidity, we
nd that stricter bank regulation mitigates this negative e¤ect during crisis and more
powerful banking supervisors aggravate the negative e¤ect of the crisis. We nd a dif-
ferent e¤ect of bank regulation for large banks where stricter bank capital regulation
improves liquidity provision. Finally, a concentrated ownership structure attenuates the
negative role of capital regulation for participant banks.
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5 Future research
Given the results from the rst two chapters, one can broaden the scope of the
sample and include large non-listed companies. Allowing non-listed rms in the sample
will increase the variation in external nance alternatives and shed light on the e¤ect
of rms being listed. It has been shown that the determinants of standard corporate
nance used to explain the capital structure also apply to banks. Since bank competition
plays a role in the capital structure of rms, it might be interesting to assess whether
this e¤ect of bank competition can be traced to the characteristics of the banks.
Bank ownership is associated with a negative e¤ect on rm value. As I went to great
lengths to identify the type of shareholder, a next step would be to include the identity
of the banks. Knowing the identity of the bank would allow insights in the reasons why
banks become shareholders or why they choose to sell their shares. Moreover, using the
characteristics of both banks and rms, I can investigate whether bank shareholdings
of a certain type or size inuence rm investments.
The impact of the nancial crisis has been addressed in chapter 2 and 4. However,
many interesting questions remain. One of them is to assess the di¤erent monetary poli-
cies of the lender parents and the pass through of these policies in economic lending.
The syndicated loan market provides an ideal sample as it provides not only detailed
loan data for a cross-section of European countries but it also contains detailed informa-
tion on a large cross-section of banks from 46 countries. This variation allows assessing
the impact of monetary policy on bank lending.
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Abstract
We explore the impact of concentration in the banking markets on the capital struc-
ture of publicly quoted non-nancial rms in the EU15 over the period 1997-2005,
an era marked by intensive merger activity in the banking sector. Our main nding
is a negative and signicant relationship between the degree of concentration of
European bank markets and the market leverage of rms, indicating the persistence
of credit constraints. This nding is robust when we use behavioral measures of
bank conduct. This support for the market power hypothesis indicates that further
measures are needed to make bank lending more competitive.
Key words: bank concentration, capital structure
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1 Introduction
The positive role of the banking sector in enhancing economic growth through a more
e¢ cient resource allocation has been widely documented (Levine and Zervos (1998)).
Since banks are important suppliers of funds to rms, the structure of bank markets as
well as the e¤ects of market structure changes on the lending behavior of banks may
have an impact on the access of rms to bank nance. It is, however, unclear how bank
market structure changes a¤ect the access of non-nancial rms to bank lending (Black
and Strahan (2002)). More concentrated banking markets have been found to lead to
lower growth, except for industries depending heavily on external nance (Cetorelli
and Gambera (2001)). In this paper we examine empirically whether the structure of
European bank markets a¤ect the use of non-nancial rms to bank nance. More
specically, we investigate the relationship between the degree of concentration of Eu-
ropean bank markets and the capital structure of non-nancial rms.
Theory o¤ers conicting predictions concerning the relation between bank market
structure and the access to and the cost of bank lending. When banks become bigger
and increase their market power, they may ration credit to specic types of rms or
make loans more expensive. This "market power" hypothesis predicts that increased
concentration in bank markets may lead to lower observed corporate leverage. How-
ever, information asymmetries or agency costs may induce banks to invest more in
relationship lending and increase the supply of loans. This "information-based" hy-
pothesis implies that bank market concentration will not hurt access to bank nance
by corporations and may lead to a higher reliance on bank debt.
We contribute to two strands of the literature as our measures of bank market struc-
ture are on the country level. First, we contribute to the evidence on how the supply of
external nance a¤ects the corporate behavior of companies. In this literature the ef-
fect of bank market structure has received little empirical focus (Lemmon and Roberts,
2007; Leary, 2009; Su, 2007). As our measures of bank market structure are on the
country level, the area is wider than the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) in the U.S.
Moreover, despite the continuing convergence in EU, national borders do seem to play
a role in bank nancing (Berger et al., 2003). Second, we contribute to the debate on
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the role of bank market structure on the external nance of companies where we focus
on listed non-nancial companies instead of small and medium enterprises (Petersen
and Rajan, 1995; Zarutskie, 2006). We argue that the available geographic market def-
inition of the banking sector is best suited for listed rms. Moreover, during the period
under consideration, the European banking sector has been characterized by a wave of
mergers and acquisitions, predominantly in the form of domestic consolidation (ECB,
2006). The result has been a substantial increase in the level of bank market concen-
tration in most countries. Similarly, European bond and stock markets have witnessed
a pronounced development and integration since the introduction of the Euro (Rajan
and Zingales, 2003) making these markets important alternatives for external nance
next to bank loans. Both time and cross-section variation in our measures of bank mar-
ket structure and increasing competition between banks and bond and stock markets
make the sample particularly interesting to investigate the impact of the evolving mar-
ket structure of nancial intermediaries on external nance decisions by non-nancial
rms. Another contribution to this strand of literature is the use of both traditional
concentration measures and behavioral measures of bank market structure. Our nal
contribution relates to instrumenting our measures of bank market structure. We use
country indexes of competition policy from Carletti et al. (2008). As these competi-
tion policies are not industry specic we argue that they are exogenous to the market
structure of the banking sector.
The sample period, 1997-2005, covers sub-periods characterized by di¤erent business
cycle conditions, so that our results are not driven by specic macroeconomic condi-
tions. Methodologically, as in Faulkender and Petersen (2006), we attempt to integrate
demand and supply factors that may a¤ect leverage decisions by non-nancial corpora-
tions. Furthermore, the panel structure of the data, using a sample of individual rms
across di¤erent years, allows us to control for unobserved time-invariant rm hetero-
geneity (Lemmon et al., 2008).
Our main nding is a negative and signicant relationship between the degree of con-
centration in the European bank markets and the market leverage of rms, implying
that increased concentration of bank markets imposes an external debt nance con-
straint on non-nancial rms. This nding is also economic signicant, an increase in
the bank Hirschmann-Herndahl Index from the mean (0.061) to the 75th percentile
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(0.109) leads to a decrease in leverage of 4.3%.These ndings are robust when we use
behavioral measures of bank competition (Lerner index and Boone indicator), instead
of the traditional market structure indicators (Hirschmann-Hirndahl Index and CR5).
Our ndings strengthen the case for further regulatory action aimed at stimulating
competition in European banking markets.
In the next section we develop the main hypotheses: the information-based hypoth-
esis and the "market power" hypothesis. The empirical strategy which integrates the
demand and supply factors for corporate leverage is outlined in section 3. We then
present our data on listed non-nancial rms, di¤erent bank market structure variables
and measures of alternative external nance (section 4). In section 5 we examine the
determinants of leverage and the impact of our measures of market structure. The bank
market structure variables are instrumented and we check the robustness of the results.
We conclude in section 6 and present broader implications of our ndings.
2 Determinants of corporate leverage: supply and demand factors
This paper examines the e¤ect of bank market concentration on the availability of
bank loans to non-nancial rms. The literature has identied two alternative hypothe-
ses: the "information-based" hypothesis and the "market power" hypothesis. Banks have
an informational advantage over public lenders. Higher bank market concentration may
make banks more e¢ cient and strengthen this information advantage, thereby inducing
banks to invest more in relationships. This should mitigate the asymmetric information
problem which is the main cause for credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) and
therefore lead to more lending and hence, to higher observed levels of corporate lever-
age. We call this the "information-based" hypothesis. The alternative hypothesis is the
market power explanation. Several theories predict a negative e¤ect of bank consolida-
tion on the availability of loans. A non-nancial company which is confronted with a
concentrated banking market may face less attractive loan conditions when banks e¤ec-
tively use their market power. As a result rms will decrease their use of bank debt and
exhibit lower leverage, assuming the absence of alternatives for external debt nance.
We call this the "market power" hypothesis. Previous empirical studies have reported
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mixed results. On the one hand Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Zarutskie (2006) nd
support for the "information-based" hypothesis. Petersen and Rajan (1994) nd that
a change in the bank market Hirschmann-Herndahl Index (HHI) of 0.01 increases the
ratio Total Debt/Assets of a typical rm by 0.36 %. Zarutskies (2006) main nding is
that the rm Outside Debt/ Assets increases by between 0.19% and 0.77 % following
an increase in HHI of 0.01.
Most research on the e¤ect of bank concentration on lending originates from the U.S.
Moreover, research has concentrated on privately-held rms, more specically SMEs,
both for the U.S. and other countries. There are solid economic reasons to focus on
SMEs: they are smaller, they are more opaque and hence characterized by larger infor-
mational asymmetry and they are more dependent on bank nancing for their invest-
ments than large public rms, suggesting that the e¤ects of bank competition should
be more pronounced for SMEs (Berger et al., 2005). In this study we focus on listed
European rms because the geographical market denition of the banking sector is on
the country level. While studies for the U.S. are able to use more rened concentration
measures, we have to rely on country-based measures of bank market structure. How-
ever, this geographic market denition should not introduce a bias, because for most
rms of our sample the country level can be considered as the relevant market. Numer-
ous studies have investigated the level of nancial integration in Europe and although
there is considerable progress in some segments, the banking markets are found to be
not fully integrated (Baele et al., 2004; Berger et al., 2003). Furthermore, if the Euro-
pean bank market was completely integrated, this would work against nding an e¤ect
of country-specic bank concentration on the capital structure of non-nancial rms.
Another important aspect is that we use market leverage as the dependent variable,
which requires data on the market value of the rms under investigation. We argue
that this strategy can yield useful results because European rms, even the larger ones,
are still heavily dependent on bank nancing. If anything, should we nd lending con-
straints due to the bank market structure for listed rms, this would only strengthen
the similar case for SMEs. Not only the size of the rm is important, the size of banks
has also been found to impact the lending behavior of banks. Berger et al. (2005) nd
that bigger banks tend more to lend to larger rms or to those having better accounting
records.
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Relationship lending is the main property of bank lending for the "information-based"
hypothesis. This is seen as the raison dêtreof banks since relationships may mitigate
informational asymmetries (James, 1987). Ongena and Smith (2000) document large
cross-country variation in the average number of bank relationships in large rms across
20 European countries. Firms maintain more relationships in countries with unconcen-
trated but stable banking systems and active bond markets. However, there has been
no consensus on the e¤ect of bank concentration on relationship lending (Boot, 2000).
Chan et al. (1986) argue that more competition in the banking market implies less
relationship banking, since borrowers might be tempted to switch to other banks or
to the bond or stock market. Banks then anticipate that relationships have a shorter
lifespan and invest less in relationships. A complementary negative e¤ect of competition
on relationship lending may come from the impact of competition on the intertemporal
pricing of loans. Increased credit market competition could impose constraints on the
ability of borrowers and lenders to share surpluses intertemporally. Therefore, banks
will not fund young corporations (Petersen and Rajan, 1995). This suggests that com-
petition leads to less lending. An alternative view is that competition may elevate the
importance of relationships as a distinct competitive edge. Boot and Thakor (2000)
show that a relationship orientation can mitigate pressure on prot margins. As a re-
lationship banking orientation can make a bank more unique relative to competitors,
interbank competition may increase the value of relationship banking. Hence, theory
does not provide a consensus on the interaction between relationship lending and bank
concentration.
The "market power" and "information-based" hypotheses focus on the supply of
bank loans. In our empirical setup, we control explicitly for the demand of external
nance and we incorporate the rm characteristics which have been found in the cor-
porate nance literature to explain capital structure behavior. The predictions of these
characteristics are discussed in the next section. First we examine collateral and size.
Collateral is closely related to relationship lending as bank loan contracts can easily
accommodate collateral requirements. An extensive theoretical literature shows that
collateral can mitigate moral hazard and adverse selection problems in loan contract-
ing (Chan and Thakor, 1987; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). However, collateral is likely
to be e¤ective only if its value can be monitored (Rajan and Winton, 1995). Besanko
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and Thakor (1987) show that competition lowers the rents of lenders and suggest that
the use of collateral is more likely with competition than monopoly. Bank concentra-
tion does not seem to alter the lenders incentives to invest in information. Where the
theoretical literature provides no consensus, empirical work by Jimenez et al. (2006)
suggests that there is a negative relationship between collateral and bank concentration.
Finally, while the relevant market denition for European rms is the country level, we
expect that the largest rms in our sample will have a truly European scope and bank
concentration on the country level will therefore not impact those rms. As a result,
we conjecture that the interaction between bank concentration and size will have the
opposite sign of the e¤ect of bank concentration.
Other institutional aspects, such as the importance and development, of the banking
markets have been investigated for their impact on the capital structure of companies.
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) use the importance of banks to examine the
impact of access to nancial intermediaries and nd that countries with larger banking
systems have companies with lower ratios of corporate net xed assets to total assets.
They further argue that di¤erences in the nancial institutions between countries a¤ect
non-nancial rmsleverage. Fan, Titman, and Twite (2006) use the supply of funds
that are available to the banking sector, assuming that the amount of funds that ows
to the banking sector can be viewed as exogenous. They nd that the bank sector
inuences the capital structure choice of rms as banks prefer o¤ering their borrowers
debt with shorter maturity. Rajan and Zingales (1995) nd that whether companies are
from a bank-based or a market-based country does not a¤ect the level of leverage, their
results suggest that bank versus market orientation leads to di¤erences in the relative
amounts of private nancing (bank loans) and arms-length nancing through market
securities. Finally, Giannetti (2003) examines both listed and unlisted companies from
eight countries in the EU for the period 1993-1997. The measures of the development of
the nancial markets, which includes a measure for bank concentration, are argued to
proxy not only for the availability of equity and market debt in a country, but also to
be indirect measures of the importance of banks. She nds that bank concentration has
a signicant negative impact on rm debt, "perhaps in order to escape banksmarket
power" (p. 208).
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3 Empirical strategy
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) argue that information asymmetry and agency prob-
lems are the market frictions that make capital structure choices relevant but also imply
that rms are sometimes rationed by their lenders. Thus, when explaining a rms lever-
age, it is important to include not only the determinants of its preferred leverage (the
demand side) but also the variables that measure the constraints on a rms ability
to increase its leverage (the supply side). Therefore, we follow their empirical strategy,
since we focus our analysis on one particular supply side factor, i.e. bank market struc-
ture. To examine the role of credit constraints and help explore the di¤erence between
bank markets (e.g., loans) and public debt markets (e.g., bonds and equity); we consider
rm leverage to be a function of bank market concentration and the development of
both the bond market and equity market. The observed debt level is a function of the
supply and the rms demand, both of which depend on the price of capital.
Qdemand = 0Price+ 1Xdemand factors + "demand (1)
Qsupply = 0Price+ 1Xsupply factors + "supply (2)
If there are no supply frictions, rms can borrow as much debt as they want (at the
correct price), and the observed level of debt will equal the demanded level. This is
the traditional assumption in the empirical capital structure literature. Only demand
factors explain variation in the rmsdebt levels, where demand factors are any rm
characteristic that raises the net benet of debt.
However, if rms without access to public debt markets are constrained in the amount
of debt that they may issue (private lenders do not fully replace the lack of public debt),
or when they face concentrated banking markets, they will have lower leverage ratios,
even after controlling for the rms demand for debt. Equating the demand and supply,
we can express the above equations as two reduced form equations one for quantity
and the other for price so that each is a function of the demand and supply factors.
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Qobserved = DXdemand factors + SXsupply factors +  (3)
We use a measure of bank market structure or bank conduct to capture the external
nancing constraints imposed by the access to bank loans. As stated before, theory
provides mixed arguments leading to two opposing hypotheses. On the one hand, higher
bank market concentration may lead to more bank nancing under the "information-
based" hypothesis. On the other hand, concentration may be associated with less bank
nancing when the "market power" hypothesis holds. We control for two alternatives,
bond nancing and equity issuing. We expect that bond nancing will be positively
linked with leverage since rms can turn to the nancial markets if the bond market is
well developed. With respect to equity issuing, rms will be able to issue equity more
easily if the stock market is well developed. As a result they will have lower leverage.
The demand factors are captured by the rm characteristics. Rajan and Zingales
(1995) examine large companies from the G-7 and nd that the rm characteristics
that explain capital structure in the U.S. also explain leverage in other countries. Sev-
eral factors have been found to have a robust correlation with cross-sectional di¤erences
in leverage (Frank and Goyal, 2005). Leverage is positively related to tangibility, size
and median industry leverage, whereas it is negatively related to growth opportunities
and protability. Tangibility captures the presence of xed assets which are easier to col-
lateralize. Therefore, rms remain more valuable when they go into distress, hence rms
with a lot of collateralizable assets will nd it easier to obtain bank loans. Furthermore,
the agency costs for rms with high tangible asset ratios are lower, as collateral makes it
more di¢ cult for shareholders to substitute high-risk assets for low-risk ones. The next
factor is size. Large rms will have more debt since larger rms are more diversied
and have lower default risk. Larger rms are also typically more mature rms that have
a reputation in debt markets and consequently face lower agency cost of debt. Finally,
median industry leverage reects a number of otherwise omitted common factors and in
a trade-o¤ setting, the industry median debt ratio is likely to be a proxy for the target
capital structure. The growth opportunities of the rm are negatively correlated with
leverage since growing rms are assumed to lose more of their value when they go into
distress. Furthermore agency costs, which can arise due to underinvestment, asset sub-
stitution or free cash ow are mitigated to a large extent in growth rms. Finally, the
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negative correlation found for rm protability is usually ascribed to lower expected
bankruptcy costs and more valuable interest tax shields. Firms that generate higher
prots relative to investments also benet from the discipline that debt provides in
moderating the free cash ow problem (agency cost). In our empirical setup, we include
all these stylizeddemand factors (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Fama and French, 2002;
Flannery and Rangan, 2006) next to the supply e¤ect of bank market concentration to
explain the variation in corporate leverage.
4 Data
The sample of non-nancial rms is constructed from Amadeus, a pan-European
nancial database that provides detailed balance sheet and income data of companies
in Europe and standardized balance sheet information with the objective of achieving
uniformity and enabling cross-border analysis. We select all consolidated listed rms
of the EU15 for the period 1996-2005. This sample of rms is merged with market
data from Datastream; we use the ISIN code of the rm as identier. To reduce the
impact of outliers we winsorize the sample at the 1st and 99th percentile. We delete
all observations for which one of the variables is missing, this leads to the exclusion of
rms from Denmark for which no loan data is available and rms from Luxembourg
for which no data on private bond capitalization is available 1 . The nal sample is an
unbalanced sample of 3,364 rms and 19,735 rm-year observations. Table 1.A presents
an overview of the rm-specic variables used in our empirical analysis to capture the
demand side together with their sources. The construction of the variables is standard in
the literature (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Flannery and Rangan, 2006). The dependent
variable used in the analysis is market leverage which is constructed as the ratio of
debt, both short and long term, over the sum of debt and market value of the rm. We
1 We use yearly updates from 1999 to 2006 of Amadeus to mitigate attrition problems. For
Greece no consolidated data is available. We also run the regressions without Greece, the
results remain the same. We exclude all nancial rms with NACE Rev 1.1 code 65 Financial
intermediation, except insurance and pension funding, 66 Insurance and pension funding,
except compulsory social security, 67 Activities auxiliary to nancial intermediationand
regulated rms, NACE Rev 1.1 code 75 Public administration and defense; compulsory social
security. When we include Denmark and Luxembourg in the base regressions, the results
remain unaltered.
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also use book leverage, dened as the ratio of debt over total assets, but this leads to
similar qualitative results.
The supply side is measured using several indicators of bank concentration and con-
duct at the country level (Table 1.B), the size of the bond and equity market at the
country level and a dummy indicating whether a rm issues a bond (Table 1.C). The
ECB provides yearly concentration gures for the EU15 from 1997 onwards in their
reports on EU banking structure (ECB, 2004, 2006, 2007). The rst measure is the
Hirschmann-Herndahl Index (HHI), calculated as the sum of the squares of the credit
institutionsmarket shares, according to total assets. Our second measure is the CR5,
which is the share of the 5 largest credit institutions in total assets in each country.
The HHI ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 indicates perfect competition and 1 would indicate
a monopoly. The assumption is that less players in the market and therefore a more
concentrated market leads to less competition as the remaining players can exercise
market power.
Nevertheless, banks are special in nature and it has been suggested that the standard
paradigm, that higher concentration leads to market power (Bain, 1956), may not be
appropriate for the banking industry (see Degryse and Ongena, 2008). Due to asym-
metric information inherent in bank lending, banking competition may have a special
nature(Carletti, 2005). Therefore, in addition to HHI and CR5, which are well known
and widely used concentration measures, we use two alternative measures for the ob-
servable competitive behavior of banks, i.e. the Lerner index and the Boone indicator,
as robustness checks. The Lerner index measures the degree of competition based on
the observed pricing behavior of banks (the indicator is calculated as (price marginal
cost)/price). The index can take values between 0 and 1, where 0 stands for perfect com-
petition and 1 for monopoly power. Therefore, a positive sign would lend support for the
"information-based" hypothesis whereas a negative sign would provide support for the
"market power" hypothesis. Using the Lerner index, Fernández de Guevera and Maudos
(2007) nd support for a negative relationship between concentration and competition.
Fernández De Guevara and Maudos (2007) calculate this measure for all the countries
in our sample, until 2000. The Boone indicator measures the e¤ect of e¢ ciency in terms
of marginal cost on market shares. The rationale is that competition enhances the per-
formance of e¢ cient rms (lower marginal cost) which will lead to higher market shares.
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Moreover, this e¤ect is assumed to be positively correlated with competition, hence the
stronger competition is, the more negative the Boone indicator will be. Therefore, the
interpretation of the impact of the measure will be similar to that of the Lerner index
where a positive (negative) impact lends support to the "information-based" hypothesis
("market power" hypothesis). Van Leuvensteijn, Bikker, van Rixtel and Kok-Sørensen
(2007) apply the measure to commercial banks. The Boone indicator is available for
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Netherlands and UK for the period 1997 to 2004 2 .
Alternative sources to bank nancing are included using three indicators of nancial
market development; two are obtained from the Financial Development and Structure
database of the World Bank and one from Datastream. We use the ratio of private
domestic debt securities to GDP, as a proxy for the development of the bond market,
and the value of listed shares to GDP as a proxy for the development of stock markets.
Our nal measure of access to external nance is obtained checking which rms issue a
bond using the bond module in Datastream. This provides us with a dummy which has
value one starting from the year that the rm issues a bond. We include this dummy to
explicitly account for one particular outside nancing option using the fact that some
rms e¤ectively use bond nancing, whereas others do not.
Finally, we include measures to control for robustness (Table 1.D) such as a contesta-
bility measure of national bank markets in order to capture the potential competition
banks face in their home markets. Claessens and Laeven (2004) nd no evidence that
bank sector concentration has a negative e¤ect on competition in a sample of 50 coun-
tries, but report that contestability determines e¤ective competition. The measure of
contestability is the share of total assets of foreign branches and subsidiaries relative
to the total assets of the banking sector in a particular country (ECB, 2007). The rel-
ative size of foreign branches and subisidiaries measures the incidence of foreign banks
entering the market, which should increase the pressure on the incumbent banks to
behave more competitively. Hence, we expect a positive impact of contestability on the
leverage of non-nancial rms.
2 An alternative measure of bank behavior would be the Panzar-Rosse measure. Bikker and
Haaf (2002) calculate this H-statistic for 23 European and non-European countries and nd
support for the view that concentration impairs competition. However, we lack su¢ cient data
for this measure to apply it in our panel data framework.
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In Table 2, columns 1 and 2, we report the mean of the two concentration measures
(HHI and CR5) for the period 1997-2005 and their percentage change between 1997
and 2005 in each country in the sample. There is considerable heterogeneity among
the European countries. Moreover, the percentage change in the HHI between 1997 and
2005 is positive in almost all countries, reecting a considerable amount of consolidation
in the banking sector. Columns 3 and 4 show that there is again a considerable degree of
heterogeneity across countries for private bond market capitalization. However, there is
no clear relation between the relative size of the country and the importance of its bond
market. The relative stock market capitalization also di¤ers across countries, where the
bigger countries tend to have the most developed equity markets. The percentage of
rms issuing a bond across countries in column 5 indicate that there is a large dispersion
in terms of e¤ective bond market use by rms, but also that bond issuing is still only
a possibility for a small number of rms. When we subdivide the rms in the sample
in deciles according to market value, 66% of the rms having issued bonds are larger
than the 70th percentile.
The summary statistics of the rm variables are presented in Table 3. We nd sub-
stantial cross-sectional variation in both market and book leverage. The average lever-
age ratio is 26.6 % with a median of 21.1 %. There is variation across countries as
well as across rms within each country. The summary statistics are comparable to
the numbers reported in previous research, predominantly with U.S. data (Rajan and
Zingales, 1995; Giannetti, 2003; Flannery and Rangan, 2006). The table also shows
cross-sectional variation in the country-level variables. Our main variable of interest,
HHI, has a mean of 0.061 but an equally large standard deviation. Over the considered
period the HHI ranges from a minimum of 0.011 to a maximum of 0.273, indicating
the co-existence of bank markets with a high and low degree of concentration. The
alternative measure for bank market concentration: CR5, ranges from 0.170 to 0.880.
The smallest countries typically have more concentrated banking markets. Moreover,
the size of rms may have an impact on external nancing behavior. If the distribution
of the rms according to size would show that the small countries have typically more
small rms than big rms relative to big countries, there could be a size bias. Table
4 shows the sample divided into size deciles where the size of the rm is measured
by its market value. The rst decile represents the smallest rms and the tenth decile
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the largest rms. In most countries the rms are relatively uniformly spread over the
deciles. This distribution of rms across the countries in the sample indicates that any
rm size bias should be negligible.
In Table 5 the Pearson correlation matrix indicates that multicollinearity should not
be a serious problem. The correlations between leverage and the rm characteristics
have the expected sign and suggest that protability and growth opportunities may
be negatively correlated with leverage, while size, tangibility and the leverage industry
median are positively correlated with leverage. Noteworthy for our analysis, the cor-
relations suggest that the country-level variables may potentially inuence the capital
structure choice. The correlation of leverage with both concentration measures is nega-
tive whereas the measure of private bond market capitalization is positive. Stock market
capitalization is negatively correlated with market leverage. These raw correlations do
not, however, control for other characteristics.
5 Empirical results
Our base model is:
leveragei;j;t = Zi;t 1 + Xj;t + i + t + vi;j;t (4)
where the dependent variable is market leverage. Zi;t 1 captures the demand side
and contains all the rm characteristics that are standard in the empirical corpo-
rate nance literature (xed assets, growth opportunities, size, protability and in-
dustry median leverage). These variables are lagged to attenuate the endogeneity prob-
lem. Xj;t captures the supply side and contains bank concentration or bank conduct
(HHI/CR5/Lerner/Boone), private bondmarket capitalization over GDP (Private Bond),
the stock market capitalization (Stock Market Cap) or a dummy variable taking the
value one from the year onwards in which the rm starts issuing bonds (Dummy Bond).
We use the subscript j to indicate that these variables, except for Dummy Bond, are
at the country level. We use panel corrected standard errors allowing for heterogeneity
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at the rm level (i.e. Rogers standard errors). 3 We argue that the xed e¤ects speci-
cation is the relevant one, both from a methodological and an economic point of view.
First, including rm xed e¤ects alleviates the concern of omitted variable bias. Second,
when one is interested in partial regression coe¢ cients, holding other e¤ects constant,
what matters is whether the e¤ects are independent of the observed regressors or not
(Arellano, 2003). In addition, Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) state that, given
the importance of unobserved heterogeneity in leverage, parameter estimates that do
not account for the rm-specic e¤ect and serial correlation are suspect. Therefore, we
use a within transformation by incorporating rm xed e¤ects and use panel corrected
standard errors allowing for heterogeneity at the rm level (Rogers standard errors)
together with year dummies (dummy for 2005 is excluded) to control for serial corre-
lation. Finally, xed e¤ects at the rm level also control for industry and/or country
e¤ects. Therefore, the rm e¤ects will encompass not only rm-specic characteristics
but also those regulatory and macroeconomic conditions in the di¤erent countries that
do not change over time.
5.1 The determinants of leverage
Table 6 presents the basic regressions. In the rst column we explain the variation in
the leverage ratio by only including rm characteristics in order to capture the demand
side of corporate nancing choices. In the second column we introduce the HHI as a
measure of bank market concentration in order to take the supply side of bank loans into
account. In the third column we also control for alternative sources of nance, i.e. the
bond and the stock market. The last three columns show the results when, respectively,
CR5, the Lerner index or the Boone indicator are used as alternative concentration or
competition measures.
The rst column shows that the coe¢ cients of the rm characteristics have the ex-
pected sign and our results are broadly in line with previous ndings in the literature
3 We do not use the Fama-MacBeth estimation technique since Petersen (2007) documents
that this estimation method is less suited for panels with a large cross-section and small time
series.
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(Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Giannetti, 2003; Fama and French, 2002). Firm protabil-
ity has a negative sign and is signicant. The market-to-book ratio (proxy for growth
opportunities) and depreciation have the expected sign but they are statistically in-
signicant. Size, tangibility and the industry median have positive and signicant coef-
cients. These ndings remain robust throughout the di¤erent specications, indicating
that the rm-specic variables capture the demand for external debt nance adequately.
The question is whether loan supply conditions, captured by the degree of bank mar-
ket concentration and its evolution over time, have a signicant inuence on the rms
choice of leverage.
The second column shows that bank market concentration, measured with the HHI,
has a signicantly negative e¤ect on the observed levels of rm leverage when included
separately. In the third column, we include the proxies for the alternatives to bank
nancing, the bond and stock market capitalization variables, but the HHI remains
negative. This suggests that higher levels of bank market concentration cause a more
di¢ cult access of rms to bank loans or may even lead to some degree of credit rationing.
This is consistent with the "market power" hypothesis. Since we account for the demand
side of corporate leverage, our results imply that bank consolidation may cause nancing
constraints, even for the larger rms in the economy. Looking at the economic impact
of higher bank market concentration on rm leverage, a change in HHI from the mean
(0.061) to the 75th percentile (0.109) leads to a decrease in leverage of 4.3%. A change in
HHI of 0.01 would lead to a decrease in leverage of 0.9 %, which is in line with the results
found for SMEs (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Zarutskie, 2006). The private bond market
capitalization variable is insignicant in this specication. We have to interpret this
nding with caution since, even though Table 2 indicates that only a small proportion
of rms in Europe e¤ectively have access to the bond markets, it is unlikely that more
developed bond markets would have no e¤ect on the capital structure choices of all
rms. Whats more, the corporate bond market exhibited substantial growth only after
the introduction of the Euro in 1999 (we will test for this break later on). The stock
market capitalization variable has the expected negative sign: the better developed the
stock markets are, the less rms opt to hold debt.
The next three columns present the results with alternative measures of bank con-
centration. In column 4 we observe that the CR5 measure of bank market concentration
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is negative and statistically signicant. This corroborates the ndings with the HHI,
which is not unexpected given the high degree of correlation between both measures
reported in Table 5. In the next two columns we include two behavioral measures for
the degree of bank competition, as alternatives for the market concentration variables.
The coe¢ cients for both the Lerner index and the Boone indicator are negative and
signicant, corroborating the results for the HHI or CR5. The stock market variable
remains unaltered, whereas the bond market variable now is signicantly positive, as
expected. Therefore, the alternative measures for bank market competition conrm the
nding that a less competitive bank market structure has a negative e¤ect on rm
leverage, which is consistent with the "market power" hypothesis. The economic signif-
icance remains as an increase of one standard deviation in CR5, the Lerner Index and
the Boone Indicator leads to a respective decrease in leverage of 8.0%, 7.1% and 3.5%.
5.2 Endogeneity
Using observed changes in bank market structure to explain di¤erences in lever-
age across countries can create an endogeneity problem. The market structure of the
banking sector can itself be inuenced by rmsnancing decisions. Moreover, the de-
velopment of other institutions could drive both the bank market structure and rm
leverage. While an individual rm takes the market structure of the banking sector as
given, that market structure may be a¤ected by the aggregate decision of all rms.
One plausible explanation could be that companies with higher leverage have higher
investment. Hence, these companies will need more external capital, which could trigger
the entry of foreign banks in that country, thereby altering the market structure of the
banking sector. To address the endogeneity issue we re-estimate the baseline regression
using the instrumental variables approach. We follow Fan et al. (2006) and use the size
of bank deposits in a country and the amount of non-life insurance premiums as instru-
ments for bank market structure. Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) propose the
countrys level of development and its legal system as instruments. However, since we
focus on the EU15, our sample is very homogeneous in the level of development and is
characterized by strong regulatory convergence. As an alternative, we use a dataset from
Carletti et al. (2008) who constructed indices to capture the various dimensions of com-
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petition policy and M&As (Table 1.E). Carletti et al. (2008) cover both the introduction
of competition laws and competition authorities as well as changes in the relative re-
sponsibilities of competition and supervisory authorities in bank merger reviews. They
also document the precise dating of the changes in competition law, allowing time vari-
ation in the measures. Carletti et al. (2008) argue that in all cases, the introduction of
competition control constituted a signicant change for the countries involved. The IV
results are presented in Table 7. The rst column shows results where bank deposits,
non life insurance premium volume and the competition policy measures of Carletti et
al. (2008) are used as instruments for HHI. The e¤ect on corporate leverage remains
negative, the coe¢ cient is three times larger than in the OLS estimations. In the second
column, we include the interaction between HHI and the instruments from column 1
in our instrument set; the results are very similar to our baseline regression. The next
columns show that this result remains unaltered for our alternative measures of bank
market structure (CR5, the Lerner index and the Boone indicator). All measures con-
rm the negative and signicant e¤ect of bank market structure on leverage. Overall,
we can conclude that controlling for endogeneity does not alter the results.
5.3 Robustness
We apply a number of checks to assess the robustness of our ndings. In the rst three
columns of Table 8 we examine the stability of the results across size classes. We split
up our sample of rms in quartiles based on the market value of the rms. The results
for the rms in the rst quartile (relatively small rms) are in column 1, those for the
rms in the second and third quartile in column 2 and the ndings for the largest rms
are presented in column 3. The coe¢ cients indicate that the estimated e¤ects are not
robust to di¤erences in size. Whereas the coe¢ cients for the rms in the middle quartiles
are similar to those in the full sample estimation, for the quartiles with the smallest
and largest rms the bank concentration variable is insignicant. While this can be
expected for the largest rms, since they should have easier access to bond nancing,
it is not clear why bank concentration would loose signicance for the smallest rms.
An explanation might be that for these smaller rms the country level is too wide as a
geographic market denition of the banking market. However, when we substitute the
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CR5, Lerner index or Boone indicator for HHI in the rst size quartile estimation, the
coe¢ cient is signicant negative, as in the full sample, supporting the "market power"
hypothesis. These results indicate that analyzing bank/rm interactions for specic
size segments have to be treated with caution. In column 4 we use only those rms
that issue bonds and introduce a more rened measure to capture access of rms to
the bond market. Dummy Bond is a dummy variable for those rms that have issued
bonds, which takes value one starting from the year that the rm taps the bond market.
The dummy variable exhibits the expected signicant positive e¤ect of bond nancing
on leverage and the coe¢ cient on bank market concentration becomes insignicant.
This conrms the conjecture that the degree of bank market concentration matters
less for those rms with e¤ective access to bond nancing. This also implies that the
further development and increased integration of bond markets in Europe may be an
e¤ective way of disciplining bank behavior. In column 5, a dummy variable taking the
value one after 1999 is included. Our intention is to take the introduction of the euro
in 1999 and the subsequent development and gradual integration of nancial markets
into account. This procedure addresses the concern that there might be a structural
break in the sample. We also interact this dummy with the concentration measure.
The Eurodummy turns out to be positive and signicant indicating that European
rms increased their leverage after 1999. Whether or not this can be fully attributed
to the Euro cannot be established from this simple exercise, since it is also possible
that business cycle e¤ects or changes in interest rate conditions may have contributed.
The interaction term with HHI is insignicant, indicating that there is no additional
e¤ect on leverage that was not already captured by bank market structure itself. We
nd bank market concentration variable remaining negative and signicant, as in the
baseline regressions. In the nal column of Table 8 we include the relative presence of
foreign banks to account for the contestability of national bank markets. As we expect,
this measure has a signicant positive impact, suggesting that companies nd it easier
to get external nance in countries where there is more bank entry. Yet, the e¤ect of
contestability does not compensate the e¤ect of bank concentration; on the contrary,
the e¤ect of bank market concentration becomes even more pronounced.
Table 9 contains a number of additional specications to account for economic or
methodological concerns. In the rst column we include measures capturing the macro-
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economic conditions (GDP growth and ination) because they may inuence the will-
ingness of banks to lend. The coe¢ cient for bank market concentration remains negative
and signicant. In the specication reported in the second column of Table 9, we run
the baseline regression, but exclude those rms which have a zero debt ratio because
this choice may be driven by totally di¤erent motivations. All results remain unaltered
and the signicance of the HHI becomes stronger. The next two columns contain two
interaction e¤ects. The interaction e¤ect of bank concentration with collateral is in-
signicant. The interaction with size has a signicant positive e¤ect, but the negative
e¤ect of bank concentration becomes stronger, hence a larger rm size can only partially
alleviate the nancial constrainedness. In column 5 of Table 9, we lag the supply vari-
ables but the results from the base regression carry over. The nal specication in Table
9 reports the results from a dynamic estimation as in Flannery and Rangan (2006). This
accounts for the argument that rms may face adjustment costs when changing their
level of leverage. The lagged leverage variable is instrumented with lagged book lever-
age and the rm characteristics. Although this procedure constitutes only a rst step
in applying dynamic estimation, the results for the bank market concentration measure
remain qualitatively unaltered.
6 Conclusions
Credit constraints imposed by banks on rms may hamper economic growth. In
this paper we examine whether or not changes in the market structure of European
bank markets a¤ect the access of non-nancial rms to bank nance. More specically,
we investigate the relationship between the degree of concentration of European bank
markets and the capital structure of non-nancial rms. In our empirical investigation
we confront the "information-based" and the market power theories, using panel data of
3364 listed rms from the EU15 over the period 1997-2005. During the last decade, the
European banking sector has been characterized by a wave of mergers and acquisitions,
predominantly in the form of domestic consolidation, leading to a marked increase in the
measured level of market concentration in most European countries. Simultaneously, the
European bond and stock markets have witnessed a rapid development and a gradually
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increasing degree of integration since the introduction of the Euro. These developments
in the bank and nancial markets make the period under consideration, 1997-2005, and
the geographical scope (EU15) particularly interesting to investigate the impact of the
evolving market structure of nancial intermediaries on external nancing decisions by
non-nancial rms.
Overall, our results lend empirical support to the "market power" hypothesis. We
nd a negative and signicant relationship between the degree of concentration of Eu-
ropean bank markets and the market leverage of non-nancial rms. As the mean over
the countries is 0.061 and the 75th percentile is 0.109, a change from the mean to the
75th percentile would mean a drop in leverage of 4.3%. When we substitute the bank
market concentration variables for indicators of bank competition based on the observed
behavior of banks, the results remain unaltered. Since we control for endogeniety, alter-
native sources of external nance and for the rm-specic factors driving the demand
for leverage, we are condent that these ndings reect a supply-side e¤ect, implying
that the ongoing consolidation of bank markets may impose an external debt nance
constraint on non-nancial rms. Our results are not consistent with the "information-
based" hypothesis since we nd no evidence that banks in more concentrated markets
tend to engage in relationship lending, not even with the listed rms in our sample. One
possibility for rms would be exploiting the competition between banks and nancial
markets to obtain more favorable nancing conditions. Our nding that rms with ef-
fective access to the bond market are less constrained in their choice of leverage points
in this direction. In any case our results imply that the ongoing (domestic) consolida-
tion of the banking industry in Europe can potentially hamper the access of rms to
bank nancing. From a policy perspective, this calls for renewed e¤orts to increase the
contestability and integration of bank lending markets in Europe.
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Variable Definition Source
Market value of the 
firm / Size of the firm
Share price * Outstanding shares + Loans (Debt for less than one 
year) + Long term debt (Debt for more than one year)
Amadeus + Datastream
Market leverage Loans + Long term debt / Market value of the firm Amadeus + Datastream
Book leverage Loans + Long term debt / Total assets Amadeus
Profitability EBIT / Total assets Amadeus
Growth Opportunties Market value of firm / Total assets Amadeus + Datastream
Depreciation Depreciation / Total assets Amadeus
Tangibility Fixed tangible assets / Total assets Amadeus
Leverage Industry The firm's industry median debt ratio (Using the Fama and 
French industry classification)
Amadeus
HHI The sum of the squares of the credit institutions' market shares, 
according to total assets. TThe index can take values between 0 
and 1, where 0 stands for perfect competition and 1 for 
monopoly power.
ECB
CR5 The share of the 5 largest credit institutions in total assets in each 
country
ECB
Lerner (Price – Marginal cost) / Price . The index can take values 
between 0 and 1, where 0 stands for perfect competition and 1 
for monopoly power. 
Fernández De Guevara 
and Maudos (2004)
Boone Indicator Assumes that competition enhances the performance of efficient 
frims. The stronger competition is, the more negative the Boone 
indicator must be.
van Leuvensteijn, Bikker, 
van Rixtel and Kok-
Sørensen (2007)
Private Bond The ratio of private domestic debt securities issued by financial 
institutions and corporations as a share of GDP
World Bank
Dummy Bond Dummy variable which has value of 1 starting from the year that 
the firm issues a bond
Datastream
Stock Market Cap The value of listed shares to GDP World Bank
Table 1
Definitions of the variables
A. Firm specific variables
B. Measures of bank market structure
C. Alternative sources of external finance
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Variable Definition Source
GDP Growth IMF IFS
Inflation IMF IFS
Contestability The share of total assets of foreign branches and subsiduaries 
relative to the total assets of the whole banking sector in that 
particular country
ECB
Bank Deposits Demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money banks as a 
share of GDP
World Bank
Non-life Insurance Nonlife insurance premium volume as a share of GDP World Bank
Competition policy - 
criteria
Index ranging from 0 to 1 using assessment criteria that are used 
in competition control
Carletti, Hartmann and 
Ongena (2008)
Competition policy - 
control
Index ranging from 0 to 1 using who is (are) the decision-making 
agency(ies) for competition control
Carletti, Hartmann and 
Ongena (2008)
Competition policy - 
third party
Index ranging from 0 to 1 using if a third agency can intervene in 
the process to replace/overturn the decision-making agency(ies)
Carletti, Hartmann and 
Ongena (2008)
Competition policy - 
notification
Index ranging from 0 to 1 using if merger notification is 
mandatory above (statutory) thresholds
Carletti, Hartmann and 
Ongena (2008)
Table 1 Continued
Definitions of the variables
D. Robustness variables
E. Instrumenting variables
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-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6
CR5 Lerner Boone
HHI -0.843 -0.893
[5.23]** [5.35]**
CR5 -0.424
[6.33]**
Lerner -1.446
[9.06]**
Boone -0.012
[7.17]**
Private Bond -0.002 -0.005 0.44 0.159
[0.06] [0.14] [6.35]** [3.42]**
Stock Market Cap -0.027 -0.022 -0.051 -0.331
[2.67]** [2.13]* [3.43]** [7.22]**
Profitability -0.175 -0.173 -0.172 -0.173 -0.135 -0.257
[10.55]** [10.44]** [10.36]** [10.41]** [4.74]** [7.27]**
Growth Opportunities -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.007 -0.013
[9.42]** [9.31]** [9.22]** [9.25]** [3.05]** [6.31]**
Depreciation -0.0004 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.11 0.069
[0.01] [0.04] [0.01] [0.06] [1.10] [0.74]
Size 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.001 0.054
[6.40]** [6.32]** [6.27]** [6.37]** [0.20] [5.87]**
Tangibility 0.146 0.148 0.149 0.146 0.107 0.096
[5.99]** [6.05]** [6.09]** [5.99]** [4.06]** [2.33]*
Industry Median 0.224 0.227 0.23 0.226 0.131 0.117
[5.51]** [5.62]** [5.70]** [5.60]** [2.43]* [2.07]*
[2.67]** [2.13]* [3.43]** [7.22]**
Firm FE 3364 3364 3364 3364 2377 1305
Year FE 8 8 8 8 8 8
Observations 19735 19735 19735 19735 7002 6606
R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.22
HHI
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the annual time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of Market Leverage.
External finance markets variables include the Hirshmann-Herfindahl Index of the bank sector (HHI) in column 1 and 2, the
concentration ratio of the 5 largest banks (CR5) in column 3, the Lerner Index (Lerner) in column 4, the Boone Indicator (Boone) in
column 5. All regressions include market capitalization of the private bond market to GDP (Private Bond), and market
capitalization of the stock market to GDP (Stock Market Cap). Firm-level control variables are lagged one period and include
profitability, growth opportunities, depreciation, firm size (Size), tangibility and European industry Market Leverage Industry
according to the Fama/French classification (Leverage Industry). All regressions include year and firm fixed effects. Refer to Table
1 for variable definitions. The sample period is from 1997 to 2005. The robust t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for
clustering at the firm-level. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Baseline regression
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50
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5
CR5 Lerner Boone
HHI -3.163 -1.204
(3.19)** (7.33)**
CR5 -0.592
(8.97)**
Lerner -1.558
(9.49)**
Boone -0.013
(7.13)**
Private Bond -0.025 -0.017 -0.032 0.474 0.165
-0.72 -0.5 -0.9 (5.66)** (3.35)**
Stock Market Cap -0.049 -0.034 -0.029 -0.054 -0.315
(3.81)** (3.55)** (3.01)** (3.42)** (6.65)**
Profitability -0.163 -0.167 -0.169 -0.124 -0.26
(10.68)** (10.98)** (11.06)** (4.19)** (6.64)**
Growth Opportunities -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.007 -0.013
(9.21)** (9.70)** (9.73)** (2.79)** (5.79)**
Depreciation 0.00003 -0.004 -0.006 0.092 0.089
(0.01) (0.08) (0.11) (0.86) (0.9)
Size 0.03 0.031 0.032 0.006 0.058
(6.28)** (6.52)** (6.68)** -0.72 (6.05)**
Tangibility 0.152 0.15 0.145 0.113 0.094
(6.60)** (6.58)** (6.40)** (4.08)** (2.17)*
Industry Median 0.253 0.245 0.24 0.144 0.13
(6.61)** (6.44)** (6.30)** (2.38)* (2.09)*
Firm FE 3356 3356 3356 1738 1282
Year FE 8 8 8 8 8
Observations 18700 18700 18700 5344 5843
R-squared 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.23
Table 7
HHI
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the annual time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of Market Leverage.
External finance markets variables include the Hirshmann-Herfindahl Index of the bank sector (HHI) in column 1 and 2, the
concentration ratio of the 5 largest banks (CR5) in column 3, the Lerner Index (Lerner) in column 4, the Boone Indicator (Boone)
in column 5. These variables are instrumented using bank deposits to GDP, non life insurance premium volume to GDP and the
competition policy measures of Carletti et al. (2008). Columns 2 to 5 include as additional instruments the interaction of the
respective measure (HHI, CR5, Lerner and Boone) with the aforementioned instruments. All regressions include market
capitalization of the private bond market to GDP (Private Bond), and market capitalization of the stock market to GDP (Stock
Market Cap). Firm-level control variables are lagged one period and include profitability, growth opportunities, depreciation, firm
size (Size), tangibility and European industry Market Leverage Industry according to the Fama/French classification (Leverage
Industry). All regressions include year and firm fixed effects. Refer to Table 1 for variable definitions. The sample period is from
1997 to 2005. The robust t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the firm-level. * significant at 5%; ** significant
at 1%
Endogeneity
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51
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6
Size Q1 Size Q2-3 Size Q4 Bond Euro Contest
HHI -0.553 -0.835 0.113 -0.338 -0.903 -1.267
[1.43] [4.06]** [0.40] [0.93] [4.81]** [7.19]**
Private Bond -0.141 0.059 0.108 -0.003 0.015
[1.44] [1.16] [1.97]* [0.09] [0.48]
Stock Market Cap 0.003 -0.034 0.001 0.028 -0.028 -0.018
[0.10] [2.33]* [0.03] [0.89] [2.68]** [1.93]
Dummy Bond 0.038
[2.42]*
HHI*Euro Dummy 0.001
[0.11]
Euro Dummy 0.047
[5.01]**
Contestability 0.220
[7.27]**
Profitability -0.105 -0.153 -0.162 -0.31 -0.172 -0.172
[4.48]** [6.79]** [3.66]** [5.84]** [10.35]** [11.38]**
Growth Opportunities -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012
[1.51] [3.27]** [1.77] [3.33]** [9.22]** [10.01]**
Depreciation 0.07 -0.136 -0.114 0.118 -0.001 0.003
[0.73] [1.71] [0.97] [0.69] [0.01] [0.06]
Size 0.064 0.058 0.042 0.046 0.032 0.032
[4.90]** [7.59]** [4.86]** [3.78]** [6.27]** [6.83]**
Tangibility 0.139 0.131 0.102 0.054 0.149 0.148
[3.22]** [3.82]** [2.55]* [0.79] [6.10]** [6.70]**
Industry Median 0.017 0.287 0.105 0.198 0.23 0.218
[0.17] [5.46]** [1.76] [2.32]* [5.69]** [6.01]**
Firm FE 1499 2246 1131 479 3364 3364
Year FE 8 8 8 8 8 8
Observations 5229 9237 5269 3175 19735 19735
R-squared 0.09 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.14 0.15
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the annual time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of Market Leverage. External
finance markets include the Hirshmann-Herfindahl Index of the bank sector (HHI), market capitalization of the private bond market to
GDP (Private Bond), and market capitalization of the stock market to GDP (Stock Market Cap). Firm-level control variables are lagged
one period and include profitability, growth opportunities, depreciation, firm size (Size), tangibility and European industry Market
Leverage Industry according to the Fama/French classification (Leverage Industry). Column 1 to 3 split the sample in quartiles according
firm size. Column 1 uses quartile 1, column 2 quartile 2 and 3, column 3 uses quartile 4. Column 4 uses a dummy indicating whether a
firm issued a bond (Dummy Bond). Column 5 includes a dummy for the introduction of the Euro (Euro Dummy) and the interaction
with HHI. Column 6 includes contestability of the bank market (Contestability). All regressions include year and firm fixed effects. Refer
to Table 1 for variable definitions. The sample period is from 1997 to 2005. The robust t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for
clustering at the firm-level. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Robustness
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-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6
Macro Debt Collateral Size Lag Dynamic
HHI -0.859 -0.963 -1.067 -4.656 -0.765 -0.508
[5.16]** [5.54]** [5.28]** [4.16]** [3.97]** [4.68]**
Private Bond -0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.009 0.076 0.065
[0.08] [0.07] [0.04] [0.27] [1.74] [3.06]**
Stock Market Cap -0.037 -0.029 -0.026 -0.03 -0.023 -0.028
[3.67]** [2.72]** [2.58]** [2.95]** [2.16]* [3.97]**
GDP Growth -0.004
[1.63]
Inflation 0.012
[5.21]**
HHI*Tangibility 0.547
[1.34]
HHI*Size 0.196
[3.41]**
Lagged  Leverage 0.526
[32.30]**
Profitability -0.173 -0.193 -0.172 -0.17 -0.177 -0.101
[10.41]** [10.55]** [10.37]** [10.24]** [9.46]** [7.90]**
Growth Opportunities -0.012 -0.014 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 0
[9.29]** [9.33]** [9.24]** [9.27]** [6.92]** [0.30]
Depreciation 0.009 0.017 -0.001 0.007 -0.046 -0.029
[0.15] [0.27] [0.02] [0.12] [0.70] [0.64]
Size 0.034 0.03 0.032 0.021 0.031 0.008
[6.58]** [5.70]** [6.29]** [3.55]** [4.94]** [2.24]*
Tangibility 0.145 0.133 0.12 0.151 0.134 0.053
[5.95]** [5.30]** [3.63]** [6.16]** [4.79]** [3.30]**
Industry Median 0.237 0.226 0.231 0.224 0.235 0.009
[5.87]** [5.46]** [5.70]** [5.54]** [5.11]** [0.35]
Firm FE 3364 3301 3364 3364 3364 3364
Year FE 8 8 8 8 8 8
Observations 19735 18613 19735 19735 16181 19735
R-squared 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.14
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the annual time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of Market Leverage. External
finance markets include the Hirshmann-Herfindahl Index of the bank sector (HHI), market capitalization of the private bond market to
GDP (Private Bond), and market capitalization of the stock market to GDP (Stock Market Cap). Firm-level control variables are lagged
one period and include profitability, growth opportunities, depreciation, firm size (Size), tangibility and European industry Market
Leverage Industry according to the Fama/French classification (Leverage Industry). Column 1 includes GDP Growth and Inflation.
Column 2 includes only firms with a positive amount of debt. Column 3 and 4 include an interaction term with HHI, respectively
Tangibility and Size. Column 5 includes the lagged external finance market variables. Column 6 shows a dynamic specification where
lagged market leverage is instrumented with lagged book leverage. All regressions include year and firm fixed effects. Refer to Table 1
for variable definitions. The sample period is from 1997 to 2005. The robust t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at
the firm-level. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Robustness
Table 9
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Abstract
We explore whether bank competition a¤ects the interest rate spread, size, and
maturity on loans to borrowers. Results show that borrowers in more concentrated
banking markets have loans with decreased loan spreads. This e¤ect is both sta-
tistically and economically signicant. While more concentrated banking markets
reduce spreads, they do not seem to matter for loan size and maturity. However,
during crisis periods the opposite holds as more concentrated banking markets in-
crease spreads, again with no e¤ect on loans size and maturity. Overall, we show
that variation in bank market structure matters to how bank loans are priced.
Key words: Bank Market Structure, Bank Loans
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1 Introduction
This paper examines the e¤ect of bank market structure on bank loan contracts. It
is well understood that bank nancing enhances economic growth (Levine and Zervos
(1998)). However, the impact of banking market structure on bank nancing is more
debated. The current nancial crisis changes the banking market structure in important
ways. Mergers and acquisitions have been approved that would unlikely pass the compe-
tition criteria before the crisis. For example the takeover of Britains biggest mortgage
lender Halifax Bank of Scotland by U.K..s third biggest mortgage lender Lloyds TSB.
Although the O¢ ce of Fair Trading has raised concerns, the takeover was approved.
As a result, the U.K. banking market has become considerably more concentrated.
The Hirschmann-Herndahl Index of the U.K. banking market increases with 8.3%.
Therefore, understanding the e¤ect of banking market structure on bank nancing is
crucial.
We use a sample of syndicated loans from EU15 corporate borrowers. Syndicated
loans are large loans that are provided by a group of banks the syndicate to a single
borrower. In contrast to a traditional bank loan, a syndicated loan is originated by a
"lead bank" which sells pieces of the loan to other (participant) banks. Before and after
the syndication, the lead bank acts as an agent for the lending syndicate in collecting
and processing information about the borrower. The syndicated loan market represents
for the period 2000-2009 almost half of all bank lending to non-nancial companies.
Su (2007) nds that large rms are prone to opaqueness in the ability to repay loans
leading to ex-post moral hazard questioning the transparency argument. Carey and Nini
(2007) document a signicant home bias in the syndicated loan market, indicating that
large rms are dependent on their national banking market questioning the crossing
national bordersargument. Moreover, Berger et al. (2003) also show that the overall
European banking market is still far from integrated. These ndings suggest that bank
market structure may explain some of the variation in bank loan characteristics of large
listed rms.
Theory o¤ers conicting predictions about the relation between bank market struc-
ture and the access to and cost of bank lending. When banks grow and increase their
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market power, they may ration credit to specic types of rms or make loans more ex-
pensive. This "market power" hypothesis predicts that increased competition in bank
markets may lead to lower loan size, shorter maturities and higher loan spreads. How-
ever, information asymmetries or agency costs may induce banks to invest more in
relationship lending and increase the supply of loans. This "information-based" hy-
pothesis implies that bank market concentration will not hurt access to bank nance
by corporations and may lead to higher loan size, longer maturities and/or lower loan
spreads.
This study is closely related to papers which examine the e¤ect of bank market
structure on external nancing, investment, and rm growth rates (Petersen and Rajan
(1994, 1995), Zarutskie (2006), Baert and Vander Vennet (2008), González and González
(2008) and Ratti et al. (2008)). We contribute to this literature as our sample includes
the pricing of the loans.
Results show that more concentrated banking markets decrease loan spreads, but has
no e¤ect on loan size or loan maturity. The price e¤ect is both statistically and eco-
nomically signicant. The average loan spread will decrease by about 23 basis points if
a borrower moves from a country in the sample with the lowest banking concentration
to a country with the highest banking concentration, all else equal. We also examine
loans o¤ered to rms during the nancial crisis period. Aggregate loan volumes have
dropped substantially since the start of the nancial crisis. We nd that banks respond
by turning to large loans and increasing loan spreads. We nd that the increase in loan
spreads since the crisis is relatively higher for rms in countries with more concentrated
banking markets. These results suggest that the banking market structure a¤ects bor-
rowerscost of loan nance. We control for other factors that are likely to a¤ect loan
contracting, including year and country e¤ects.
In the next section we provide a discussion of the literature and the hypotheses. The
loan, borrower and bank market structure data are presented in section 3. Section 4
shows the descriptive statistics on loan and borrower characteristics and bank market
structure. The empirical results are presented in section 5 and section 6 discusses ro-
bustness issues. Section 7 examines the e¤ect of the nancial crisis on loan spreads. We
conclude in section 8.
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2 Literature
A growing body of papers studies various aspects of syndicated lending. Whether the
corporate loan market is integrated is an important question for our research. If such
is the case, then banks are not able to exercise any market power since companies can
shop easily in other countries and/or new competitor banks can enter the market. Still,
when the corporate loan market is fragmented, the possible impact of the banking mar-
ket structure gains importance. Furthermore, banks from other countries cannot easily
enter, nor can companies nd a more attractive contract abroad giving domestic banks
possible market power. Carey and Nini (2007) investigate whether the corporate loan
market is globally integrated. They nd that loan spreads are economically signicantly
lower in Europe than in the U.S. ant that borrowers stick to the home market if pos-
sible whereas lenders cross borders more frequently. However, the lenders still display
signicant home bias. Within Europe, Berger et al. (2003) provide evidence that the
banking market is not well integrated. These results suggest that the banking market
structure can play a signicant role in the characteristics of bank loans.
A large literature has examined, both theoretically and empirically, the e¤ects of bank
market structure on bank lending. Petersen and Rajan (1995) theoretically show that if
banks compete actively for loans, the rate they charge initially will reect average credit
quality, which in turn can so high that even good rms choose risky projects, which
in turn may lead to credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). By contrast, if banks
have some market power, then they can choose a lower rate initially, knowing that they
can make up any losses by earning monopoly rents on good rms in the future; this
in turn may reduce initial risk-shifting incentives and thus initial credit rationing. This
model relies on future rents or quasi-rents to maintain incentive compatibility. There-
fore, if increased competition among banks decreases rents, such competition should
also undermine relationships. Yet, this in turn suggests a possible drawback of rela-
tionships: since bank-borrower relationships implicitly rely on lack of competition, they
create an environment where the borrower is exposed to exploitative behavior (hold-up
problem), which in turn may distort borrower behavior. The "Winners Curse" lets the
inside bank earn rents on average; the greater the information advantage, the greater
the rents and thus the banks e¤ective bargaining power. Dinc (2000) shows that a
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banks ability to sustain implicit relationship lending arrangements is very small if too
few banks compete: informational monopoly lets the lender set its rate so high that any
additional gains to maintaining a good reputation are too small to prevent reneging.
On the other hand, if too many banks compete, the benets from maintaining a good
reputation are reduced, and once again banks renege. Hauswald and Marquez (2006)
show that banks acquire proprietary information both to soften lending competition
and to extend their market share. As competition increases, investments in information
acquisition fall, leading to lower interest rates but also to less e¢ cient lending decisions.
Petersen and Rajan (1995) nd empirically, consistent with their theory, that in
highly concentrated banking markets, young rms are more likely to receive bank -
nance, and the rate of interest that rms pay declines slower over time, allowing banks
to earn rents on survivors. Elsas (2000) analyzes the impact of concentration on the in-
cidence of relationship lending for German universal banks. The likelihood of observing
a Hausbank relationship is non-monotonically related to bank concentration. For low
and intermediate values of concentration, Hausbank relationships become more likely
as competition increases. This contradicts the result of Petersen and Rajan (1995) that
relation lending requires monopolistic market structures. Nevertheless, in highly con-
centrated markets, less competition fosters Hausbank relationships. Boot and Thakor
(2000) investigate the impact of bank competition and capital market competition on
relationship lending. They nd that banks make more relationship loans as interbank
competition increases, but each has lower added value for borrowers. They also investi-
gate capital market competition which reduces relationship lending (and bank lending
shrinks), but each relationship loan has greater added value for borrowers. Finally, De-
gryse and Ongena (2007) investigate the reaction of banks to increased competition.
They empirically investigate the impact of interbank competition on bank branch ori-
entation and nd that bank branches facing sti¤ local competition engage considerably
more in relationship-based lending. In sum, competition is not necessarily detrimental
to relationship lending.
Baert and Vander Vennet (2008) examine the e¤ect of bank market structure on the
capital structure of listed companies and nd that more concentrated banking markets
are associated with lower leverage, suggesting that bank market concentration leads to
bank market power. Another paper that analyzes the e¤ect of bank market concentra-
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tion and institutions on capital structure is González and González (2008). They nd
an opposite result, rm leverage increases with greater bank concentration and stronger
protection of creditor rights, where greater bank concentration substitutes for creditor
protection and asset tangibility to reduce the agency cost of debt between shareholders
and debt holders. Finally, Ratti et al. (2008) show that greater bank concentration is
associated with less tight nancial constraint during both expansions and recessions.
Their results are consistent with the "information-based" hypothesis.
Overall, theory and evidence both suggest pros and cons to concentrated bank market
structure. Benets include increased exibility and access to funding; drawbacks include
hold-up problems and negative spillovers from bank fragility. Which of these is dominant
depends critically on both the nature of the borrowing rm and the nature of the banks
that the rm has access to. Increased competition among banks tends to undermine
relationships, but too much monopoly power may have the same e¤ect.
3 Data
We combine several data sources to obtain our nal dataset: the Dealogics Loan
analytics database and DCM database (previously known as Loanware and Bondware),
the Bureau van Dijks Amadeus database and Bankscope database, Thomson Reuterss
Datastream database and various sources for country level data. We use the Dealogics
Loan analytics database to identify the rms that borrowed from banks and when they
did so. We focus on borrowers parents from the EU15. This leaves us with a sample
of 32,738 loans. When we restrict the sample to corporate borrowers, thereby exclud-
ing regulated and nancial industries, we have a nal set of 22,584 loans. These loans
are taken out by 11,640 companies which belong to 8,483 company parents. Ninety six
percent of the loans have one borrower parent. The majority of the loans (51.3%) in
our sample consist of multiple tranches, or facilities, ranging from 2 to 13 tranches.
According to Su (2007), these tranches should not be treated econometrically as indi-
vidual observations as the characteristics of the tranches of the loan are negotiated at
the same time. Therefore, we take one observation for each loan and weight variables on
the tranche level by the share of value these tranches represent in the loan. Dealogics
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Loan Analytics starts at the beginning of the 1980s and the last loan in our sample is
issued 29th of January 2010. However, since we are interested in the characteristics of
the borrowers and the lenders, we start our sample from 1990 as the database on the
borrowers only has data from that point onwards. Further information on each loan
obtained from the Loan Analytics database are: the pricing of each loan, the matu-
rity, its purpose and type, the fee structure; the borrower, its parent and their sector
of activity. And nally, we obtain information on the syndicate of the loan including
which bank participates, its role and for a sub-sample (28.37%) its participation in the
syndicate.
We use several indicators of bank concentration and bank conduct at the country
level.
1. Hirschmann-Herndahl Index (HHI): the ECB provides yearly concentration g-
ures for the EU15 from 1997 onwards in their reports on EU banking structure
(ECB, 2004 to 2009). HHI is calculated as the sum of the squares of the credit
institutionsmarket shares, according to total assets. The HHI ranges from 0 to 1
where 0 indicates perfect competition and 1 would indicate a monopoly.
2. Concentration Ratio of the 5 largest banks (CR5): this measure sums the share of
the 5 largest credit institutions in total assets in each country.
The assumption underlying these two measures is that concentration leads to less
competition as there are fewer players in the market and therefore, the remaining play-
ers can exercise market power. However, banks are special in nature and it has been
suggested that the standard paradigm, that higher concentration leads to market power
(Bain, 1956), may not be appropriate for the banking industry (see Degryse and Ongena,
2005). Therefore, in addition to HHI and CR5, which are well known and widely used
concentration measures, we use two alternative measures of the observable competitive
behavior of banks.
3. Boone indicator: this indicator measures the e¤ect of e¢ ciency in terms of marginal
cost on market shares. The rationale is that competition enhances the performance
of e¢ cient rms (lower marginal cost) which will lead to higher market shares. This
e¤ect is assumed to be positively correlated with competition, hence the stronger
competition is, the more negative the Boone indicator will be. Therefore, to inter-
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pret the impact of the measure, a positive (negative) impact lends support to the
"information-based" hypothesis ("market power" hypothesis). Van Leuven-steijn,
Bikker, van Rixtel and Kok-Sørensen (2007) apply the measure to the banking
market and single out the behavior of commercial banks, which are the most rel-
evant banks when considering the nancing of listed rms. The Boone indicator
is available for France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and UK for the
period 1997 to 2004. Therefore, all large countries in our sample are accounted for
together with one of the countries that have the highest concentration in terms of
HHI and CR5.
4. Contestability measure of national bank markets: this measure captures the poten-
tial competition banks face in their home markets. This approach is supported by
Claessens and Laeven (2004) who nd no evidence that bank sector concentration
has a negative e¤ect on competition in a sample of 50 countries, but report that
contestability determines e¤ective competition. The measure of contestability is
the share of total assets of foreign branches and subsidiaries relative to the total
assets of the banking sector in a particular country (ECB, 2007). The relative
size of foreign branches and subsidiaries measures the incidence of foreign entry of
banks, which should increase the pressure on the incumbent banks to behave more
competitively.
We rely on Bureau van Dijks Amadeus database, a pan-European nancial database
that provides detailed balance sheet and income data for 6 million companies in Europe
and standardized balance sheet information with the objective of achieving uniformity
and enabling cross-border analysis, to obtain information of rms balance sheet. We
complement the balance sheet data with market data for the public listed rms from the
Datastream database such as the market value of the companies, the yearly return and
their dividend yield. This sample of rms is merged with market data from Datastream;
we use the ISIN code of the rm as identier. We select all consolidated listed rms of
the EU15 for the period 1996-2009. To reduce the impact of outliers we winsorize the
sample at the 1st and 99th percentile. We delete all observations for which one of the
variables is missing. The nal sample is an unbalanced sample of 2,938 rms and 6,261
rm-year observations, reducing to 682 rms and 2,575 rm-year observations when we
add the borrower characteristics. The variables include size, protability, leverage, xed
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assets proportion, whether the borrower has a rating and the rating itself.
The construction of the borrower characteristic variables is standard in the liter-
ature (Rajan and Zingales (1995), Qian and Strahan (2007)). We measure access to
external nance checking rm by rm whether they issue bonds using the bond mod-
ule in Dealogic. This provides us with a dummy which has value one starting from
the year that the rm issues a bond. We include this dummy to explicitly account for
one particular outside nancing option using the fact that some rms e¤ectively use
bond nancing, whereas others do not. As country variables we include the liquid li-
abilities/GDP ratio which measures the nancial depth of an economy. Stock market
traded value/GDP measures the activity or liquidity of stock markets. The ratio of
credit provided by nancial intermediaries to the private sector to GDP measures the
nancial development of an economy and the importance of the banking sector. All of
these macroeconomic variables with the exception of GDP growth volatility are annual
values and are obtained from the World Development Indicators database. We use pri-
vate bond market capitalization to GDP, calculated as the ratio of private domestic
debt securities as a share of GDP, as a proxy for the development of the bond market,
and a measure of stock market development, i.e. the value of listed shares to GDP as
a proxy for the development of stock markets. Both are obtained from the Financial
Development and Structure database of the World Bank. Creditor rights is provided by
La Porta et al. (1998). See Appendix A for further details.
4 Summary statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics of bank market structure, loan terms, syndi-
cate structure, loan purpose, borrower characteristics, and country variables. There is
considerable heterogeneity among the European countries. The percentage change in
HHI between 1997 and 2008 is positive in almost all countries, reecting a considerable
amount of consolidation in the banking industry. The median spread is about 80.00
basis points. The mean is 118.29 and the standard deviation is 104.36, suggesting large
variation in the median loan spread across countries. The median loan maturity is about
60 months with substantial cross-country variation. The median loan size is about 375
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million euro.
An average of 6.7% of loans is secured. The median syndicate size is 10 lenders. Syn-
dicate size varies substantially; the 10th percentile is 2 banks while the 90th percentile
is 28 banks. In 41% of these syndicates, the leader of the syndicate has the same nation-
ality as the borrower. About 31.4% of loans are for renancing purposes. The second
most frequent purpose is general corporate purposes (about 17.8%). About 11.7% of
the loans are for acquisition purposes. There are fewer loans for capital expenditures,
for nancing assets, or for commercial paper backup. The borrowers in the collection
of Amadeus matched Dealogic rms are large. The median asset value is about 4.8
billion euro. The median leverage ratio is 25.4. Borrowers are protable (the median
protability is 6.6). The median tangibility ratio of tangible assets over total assets is
27.3%.
5 Results
The summary statistics presented in the previous section show signicant di¤erences
in loan and borrower characteristics across countries. To show that bank market struc-
ture matters in lending contracts, it is important to control for borrower risk charac-
teristics, loan purpose, industry e¤ects, time-period e¤ects, and rm e¤ects. Table 2
presents the coe¢ cient estimates from the random e¤ects regression of loan size, loan
maturity, and loan spreads. Columns 1 to 3 present results for the sample of all loans.
Columns 4 to 6 examine loans to borrowers matched to rms in Amadeus. The depen-
dent variables are the log of the loan tranche amount, the log of the loan maturity and
the log of all-in interest spreads. The interest rate spreads are spreads over LIBOR, EU-
RIBOR or a similar benchmark (including all possible fees). The key variable of interest
on the right-hand side is the measure of bank market structure. All regressions include
year dummies to control for changing market conditions, dummy variables for loan pur-
pose, a dummy variable indicating whether the borrower has a rating and the rating of
the borrower. The spread regressions additionally include the number of banks in the
syndicate, the log of maturity, the log of loan size, and dummy variables for security
and seniority. Columns 4 to 6 also include rm size, protability, leverage, tangibility,
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and industry dummies. The results show that spreads decline when the banking market
is more concentrated when we control for borrower characteristics. However, neither
the size of loan nor the maturity seems to be a¤ected by the market structure of the
banking market. The lower loan spreads in countries where banking markets are more
concentrated suggest that lenders require less compensation which is in line with the
information based hypothesis.
The borrower characteristic variables have the same signs as in the literature. Larger
rms borrow larger amounts at lower spreads while highly levered rms will have to pay
a larger spread. A company that can pledge more collateral or is protable has loans with
longer maturity. These results suggest that default risks are important. Loan maturity
is positively related to loan spreads, consistent with longer maturity loans being riskier
and higher spreads being charged on long-term loans. The coe¢ cient on loan size is
negative, consistent with larger loans being made to better borrowers. Secured loans
and loans that have a covenant that mentions a senior tranche have higher spreads.
The estimated coe¢ cients from column 6 suggest that, with all other variables set at
their mean values, the predicted spread decreases by 23 basis points from the minimum
value of bank market concentration to the maximum value of bank market structure
(Finland, the Netherlands in various years).
6 Robustness
6.1 Alternative measures of bank market structure
This section examines whether our results hold when alternative measures of bank
market structure are examined. The alternatives CR5, the Boone indicator and con-
testability mentioned in the Section 3 are considered. Table 3 presents results that
use these alternative proxies for bank market structure in place of HHI. We report
results from regressions relating loan spreads to these alternative proxies for bank mar-
ket structure. Results from the loan size and loan maturity regressions yield similar
conclusions.
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Column 1 of Table 3 reports results from including CR5 as a proxy for bank market
structure. Consistent with earlier results, the coe¢ cient on bank market structure is
negative and statistically signicant, implying that loan spreads are lower when a coun-
try has a more concentrated banking market. Column 2 employs the Boone indicator
as a measure of bank market structure. Higher values of this measure reect more mar-
ket power in the banking market. Again, a banking market with more market power
leads to lower spreads on loans. Column 3 employs a measure of contestability based
on the total assets of the banks. The results show that this measure of contestability
has positive and statistically signicant coe¢ cient estimates. This is in line with the
information based hypothesis. The more contestable a banking market is the more com-
petition, therefore a positive e¤ect indicates that competition drives up loan spreads.
The economic signicance of the alternative measures is more subdued as the predicted
spread decreases by respectively 10.1 and 14.6 basis points from the minimum to the
maximum value of CR5 and the Boone Indicator and increases by 4.6 basis points for
the measure of contestability.
6.2 Additional Control Variables
Recently, Qian and Strahan (2007) and Bae and Goyal (2009) show the importance
of institutional factors in the structure of syndicated loans. Therefore, Table 4 includes
additional institutional variables together with country specic variables in the base-
line regressions presented in Table 2. All models include creditor rights and ination.
Column 2 includes measures of bankruptcy and reorganization laws. Columns 3 to 4
include a dummy with the value of one when the borrower is from the same country
as the lead lender (Same Leader) and columns 5 to 6 a dummy indicating whether the
borrower has the same nationality as all lenders from the syndicate(Same Syndicate).
Columns 3 to 6 also include a dummy whether the company has access to the bond
markets (Bond).
We only report results from loan spreads in the table. Interestingly, contrary to
previous ndings, creditor rights lead to higher spreads in our sample except when we
additonally control for measures of bankruptcy and reorganization laws. When the lead
borrower is from the same country as the borrower, the spread is signicantly lower.
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The same holds true if the whole syndicate has the same nationality as the borrower.
However, when we also include the interaction between the bank market structure and
the dummies, Same Syndicate becomes insignicant whereas Same Leader remains
signicant negative. Overall, including additional institutional variables in the loan
size and loan maturity regressions does not a¤ect our previous conclusions. Results
show that a more concentrated banking market structure continues to have negative
and statistically signicant coe¢ cients even in the presence of these additional control
variables.
7 Crisis
Has the banking market structure a¤ected the response of bank loan contracts to the
current nancial crisis? The crisis can be considered relatively exogenous (at least from
the perspective of any single rm). While the crisis will have serious implications for the
future banking market structure in many countries, the crisis did not materially change
the bank market structure for any of the a¤ected countries during our sample period.
Moreover, the crisis signicantly reduces expected rates of return on investments. We
investigate whether the bank market structure has an additional impact over the crisis.
Furthermore, we examine whether during periods of crisis, rms operating in countries
with more concentrated banking markets face relatively lower increase in loan spreads.
As starting point of the nancial crisis we take 1 October 2007.
The empirical strategy is to include additional interaction terms between the crisis
period and bank market structure measure to the baseline regressions reported in Table
2. If banks cut back on lending to rms, the interaction terms between the bank market
structure measure and the crisis period should be negative in the loan size regressions
(reported in Columns 1 and 3 of Table 5). We nd a negative coe¢ cient for the crisis.
However, when we control for rm characteristics the coe¢ cient for the crisis dummy
changes sign and the interaction term of bank market structure and the crisis dummy
becomes signicant negative suggesting that the loan volume reduces more in more
concentrated banking markets. Columns 2 and 4 present results from the random e¤ects
estimations of loan maturity. We nd no e¤ect of the crisis on loan maturities. When
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we control for borrower characterisitics, the interaction term of bank market structure
and the crisis dummy is signicantly negative indicating that the maturity declined for
borrowers in concentrated banking markets during the crisis period. Columns 3 and 6
present results from the loan spread regressions with the additional interaction terms.
The coe¢ cient on the interaction between bank market structure and the crisis period
is positive and signicant, suggesting that spreads are higher in countries with more
concentrated banking markets compared to those that have less concentrated banking
markets. In summary, these results indicate the response of loan contracts to variations
in bank market structure is signicantly higher during nancial crises when monitoring
and re-contracting costs are of particular importance to lenders.
8 Conclusions
Access of rms to bank nance enhances economic growth. In this paper we examine
whether or not changes in the market structure of European bank markets a¤ect the loan
quantities, loan maturities, and the costs of loan nancing. During the last decade, the
European banking sector has been characterized by a wave of mergers and acquisitions,
predominantly in the form of domestic consolidation. Moreover, the current nancial
crisis already has and is likely to have a large impact on the level of market concentration
in most European countries.
We nd a negative and signicant relationship between the degree of concentration
of European bank markets and the spread. The results suggest that, when a borrower
moves from a country with the least concentrated banking market to a country with
the maximum value of bank market structure (Finland, the Netherlands in various
years), the predicted spread decreases by 23 basis points, with all other variables set
at their mean values. When we substitute the bank market concentration variables
for an indicator of bank competition based on the observed behavior of banks, the
results remain unaltered. Overall, our results lend empirical support to the information
based hypothesis. During crisis periods, the results show increasing loan spreads for
more concentrated banking markets. This suggests that the "market power" hypothesis
holds during crisis periods.
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-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6
Loan Size Loan Mat Spread Loan Size Loan Mat Spread
HHI 2.229 -0.593 -0.725 -0.998 -0.137 -1.017
[0.91] [1.35] [1.14] [1.02] [0.50] [2.81]**
Refinancing Purposes 0.531 -0.291 -0.271 0.565 -0.05 -0.317
[4.65]** [5.25]** [4.44]** [6.69]** [0.87] [7.43]**
Acquisition Purposes 1.153 -0.496 0.04 1.375 -0.299 0.107
[15.80]** [8.18]** [0.89] [12.25]** [4.65]** [2.47]*
General Corporate Purposes -0.049 -0.371 -0.428 0.157 -0.152 -0.399
[0.31] [5.40]** [9.12]** [2.42]* [4.53]** [9.55]**
Loan Size -0.106 -0.106
[6.16]** [6.31]**
Loan Mat 0.068 0.114
[2.86]** [3.23]**
Number Banks Syndicate -0.005 -0.003
[3.66]** [5.54]**
Secure 0.118 0.166
[3.14]** [2.67]**
Senior 0.643 0.616
[10.25]** [8.06]**
Firm Size 0.279 -0.042 -0.039
[7.18]** [3.08]** [3.60]**
Profit 0.187 0.519 0.142
[1.03] [3.79]** [0.40]
Leverage -0.133 -0.1 0.521
[0.50] [1.06] [5.08]**
Fixed -0.213 0.174 -0.148
[1.30] [3.62]** [1.57]
Rating Borrower -0.439 0.112 0.418
[5.55]** [2.23]* [13.44]**
Rating missing -2.38 0.582 1.833
[7.07]** [2.75]** [14.50]**
Year FE 11 11 11 11 11 11
Industry FE 0 0 0 45 45 45
Constant 4.339 4.132 5.961 1.893 4.341 4.935
[11.70]** [30.81]** [37.37]** [2.16]* [11.61]** [21.71]**
Observations 6261 6261 6261 2575 2575 2575
Number of firms 2938 2938 2938 682 682 682
Table 2
Base regression
This table reports random effect estimates on the firm level of coefficients of the deal-level regression of the log of the size of the
loan (Loan Size), the log of the maturity of the loan (Loan Mat) and the log of the spread of the loan (Spread). All regressions include
the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI), a dummy for the purpose of the loan: Refinancing, Acquisition or General Corporate and year
dummies. The spread regressions include the size and maturity of the loan, the number of banks in the syndicate (Number Banks
Syndicate) and whether the loans is secured (Secure) and whether the covenant mentions a senior tranche (Senior). Columns 4 to 6
include industry dummies and additionally the size of the borrower (Firm Size), the profitability of the borrower (Profit), its leverage
(Leverage) and fixed assets proportion (Fixed). Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. The sample period is from 1998 to 2009.
The robust t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; **
significant at 1%
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-1 -2 -3
Spread Spread Spread
CR5 -0.003
[2.80]**
Boone indicator -0.019
[2.70]**
Contestability 0.217
[1.84]+
Refinancing Purposes -0.316 -0.318 -0.3
[7.47]** [6.12]** [6.25]**
Acquisition Purposes 0.107 0.191 0.122
[2.46]* [2.49]* [2.64]**
General Corporate Purposes -0.399 -0.387 -0.399
[9.63]** [12.71]** [8.99]**
Loan Size -0.107 -0.124 -0.103
[6.27]** [3.45]** [6.22]**
Loan Mat 0.114 0.131 0.121
[3.24]** [4.25]** [3.15]**
Number Banks Syndicate -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
[5.33]** [0.66] [5.17]**
Secure 0.166 0.444 0.189
[2.70]** [4.90]** [2.92]**
Senior 0.617 0.688 0.618
[7.96]** [4.09]** [8.17]**
Firm Size -0.04 -0.042 -0.041
[3.75]** [4.72]** [3.16]**
Profit 0.142 0.111 0.208
[0.40] [0.23] [0.56]
Leverage 0.524 0.264 0.571
[5.18]** [0.92] [5.63]**
Fixed -0.15 -0.038 -0.199
[1.58] [0.31] [1.84]+
Rating Borrower 0.418 0.37 0.418
[13.40]** [7.33]** [12.24]**
Rating missing 1.83 1.666 1.81
[14.48]** [8.33]** [13.70]**
Year FE 11 9 11
Industry FE 45 45 45
Constant 4.11 3.466 3.927
[18.04]** [12.79]** [27.57]**
Observations 2575 1177 2314
Number of firms 682 239 625
Table 3
Alternative measures of bank market structure
This table reports random effect estimates on the firm level of coefficients of the deal-level regression of the log of the spread of the loan
(Spread). The regressions include alternative measures of bank market structure: CR5, Boone indicator and a measure of bank market
contestability. All regressions inlcude a dummy for the purpose of the loan : Refinancing, Acquisition or General Corporate, the size (Loan Size)
and maturity of the loan (Loan Mat), the number of banks in the syndicate (Number Banks Syndicate) and whether the loans is secured (Secure)
and whether the covenant mentions a senior tranche (Senior), year dummies and industry dummies and additionally the size of the borrower
(Firm Size), the profitability of the borrower (Profit), its leverage (Leverage) and fixed assets proportion (Fixed). Refer to Appendix A for variable
definitions. The sample period is from 1998 to 2009. The robust t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. +
significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6
Spread Spread Spread Spread Spread Spread
HHI -0.655 -0.702 -0.895 -1.105 -0.736 -0.676
[1.67]+ [1.28] [2.22]* [2.44]* [1.91]+ [1.64]
Creditor rights 0.035 -0.202 0.033 0.036 0.031 0.029
[2.59]** [4.74]** [2.82]** [3.56]** [2.62]** [2.41]*
Inflation -0.001 0 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[2.52]* [1.11] [2.65]** [2.86]** [2.71]** [2.71]**
Same Leader -0.137 -0.19
[5.27]** [4.71]**
HHI*Same Leader 0.0001
[1.48]
Same Syndicate -0.234 -0.082
[3.46]** [0.65]
HHI*Same Syndicate -2.939
[1.22]
No automatic stay on assets 0.324
[2.92]**
Secured creditors first paid 0.282
[2.50]*
0.185
[1.84]+
0.18
[3.46]**
Bond 0.018 0.022 0.006 0.006 0.013 0.014
[0.55] [0.67] [0.18] [0.19] [0.40] [0.42]
Refinancing Purposes -0.315 -0.317 -0.296 -0.298 -0.318 -0.318
[7.50]** [7.30]** [7.04]** [7.23]** [7.80]** [7.74]**
Acquisition Purposes 0.103 0.099 0.122 0.121 0.108 0.108
[2.36]* [2.31]* [2.80]** [2.76]** [2.45]* [2.45]*
General Corporate Purposes -0.399 -0.396 -0.383 -0.383 -0.399 -0.401
[9.90]** [9.71]** [10.11]** [10.08]** [9.91]** [9.98]**
Loan Size -0.109 -0.105 -0.107 -0.105 -0.111 -0.111
[6.21]** [6.00]** [6.02]** [5.96]** [6.67]** [6.69]**
Table 4
Robustness
This table reports random effect estimates on the firm level of coefficients of the log of the spread of the loan (Spread). All
regressions include the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI), a dummy for the purpose of the loan: Refinancing, Acquisition or General
Corporate), measure of creditor rights, inflation, the size (Loan Size) and maturity (Loan Mat) of the loan, the number of banks in the
syndicate (Number Banks Syndicate) and whether the loans is secured (Secure) and whether the covenant mentions a senior
tranche (Senior) and year dummies. Column 2 and 5 also include a dummy indicating whether the company is from the same
country as the lead lender (Same) and whether the company has access to the bond market (Bond). Columns 3 and 6 include
measures of bankruptcy and reorganization laws. Columns 4 to 6 include industry dummies and additionally the size of the
borrower (Firm Size), the profitability of the borrower (Profit), its leverage (Leverage) and fixed assets proportion (Fixed). Refer to
Appendix A for variable definitions. The sample period is from 1998 to 2009. The robust t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for
clustering at the country-level. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Restrictions for going into 
reorganisation
Management does not stay 
in reorganisation
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-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6
Loan Mat 0.116 0.116 0.117 0.117 0.116 0.116
[3.29]** [3.32]** [3.35]** [3.33]** [3.42]** [3.40]**
Number Banks Syndicate -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
[5.82]** [7.60]** [5.91]** [5.55]** [7.40]** [7.54]**
Secure 0.17 0.169 0.166 0.165 0.179 0.18
[2.73]** [2.74]** [2.65]** [2.60]** [3.07]** [3.13]**
Senior 0.616 0.62 0.597 0.598 0.614 0.612
[7.88]** [8.03]** [7.86]** [7.83]** [8.31]** [8.26]**
Firm Size -0.044 -0.043 -0.049 -0.049 -0.046 -0.046
[3.89]** [3.75]** [4.14]** [4.15]** [4.14]** [4.22]**
Profit 0.17 0.167 0.231 0.244 0.17 0.17
[0.47] [0.46] [0.63] [0.66] [0.48] [0.47]
Leverage 0.493 0.474 0.505 0.506 0.508 0.506
[4.64]** [4.52]** [4.82]** [4.85]** [4.71]** [4.69]**
Fixed -0.165 -0.182 -0.159 -0.158 -0.161 -0.152
[1.51] [1.65]+ [1.46] [1.45] [1.57] [1.53]
Rating Borrower 0.414 0.417 0.405 0.405 0.411 0.41
[13.18]** [13.27]** [13.50]** [13.48]** [13.77]** [13.99]**
Rating missing 1.819 1.83 1.782 1.781 1.805 1.804
[14.41]** [14.59]** [14.77]** [14.78]** [14.93]** [15.10]**
Year FE 11 11 11 11 11 11
Industry FE 45 45 45 45 45 45
Constant 4.163 4.051 5.327 4.405 4.274 4.288
[17.47]** [18.13]** [19.41]** [18.48]** [19.27]** [19.73]**
Observations 2575 2575 2575 2575 2575 2575
Number of group 682 682 682 682 682 682
Table 4 Continued
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-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6
Loan Size Loan Mat Spread Loan Size Loan Mat Spread
HHI 2.552 -0.454 -0.749 -0.221 0.27 -1.086
[1.14] [1.02] [1.07] [0.25] [0.78] [2.39]*
Crisis -0.251 0.015 0.239 0.195 0.057 0.322
[1.67]+ [0.19] [2.67]** [1.94]+ [0.99] [2.63]**
HHI*Crisis 0.596 -0.304 1.785 -2.171 -1.324 2.256
[0.45] [0.49] [2.02]* [1.93]+ [2.07]* [2.30]*
Refinancing Purposes 0.538 -0.287 -0.24 0.612 -0.021 -0.286
[4.17]** [5.02]** [3.88]** [6.43]** [0.36] [5.26]**
Acquisition Purposes 1.139 -0.511 -0.004 1.401 -0.271 0.049
[13.84]** [8.69]** [0.09] [11.92]** [4.38]** [0.89]
General Corporate Purposes -0.053 -0.385 -0.422 0.183 -0.155 -0.365
[0.33] [5.40]** [7.91]** [2.70]** [3.87]** [5.61]**
Loan Size -0.105 -0.108
[6.20]** [6.13]**
Loan Mat 0.038 0.035
[1.49] [0.86]
Number Banks Syndicate -0.006 -0.003
[2.99]** [3.92]**
Secure 0.116 0.189
[3.28]** [3.80]**
Senior 0.686 0.649
[11.36]** [9.08]**
Firm Size 0.283 -0.041 -0.035
[7.36]** [2.73]** [2.99]**
Profit 0.081 0.572 -0.005
[0.57] [2.93]** [0.01]
Leverage -0.044 -0.079 0.706
[0.16] [0.87] [7.26]**
Fixed -0.433 0.079 -0.208
[2.69]** [1.22] [2.77]**
Rating Borrower -0.454 0.099 0.437
[5.71]** [1.83]+ [12.76]**
Rating missing -2.477 0.512 1.864
[7.26]** [2.21]* [13.74]**
Industry FE 0 0 0 45 45 45
Constant 4.632 4.347 5.227 1.77 4.246 3.896
[16.76]** [70.31]** [45.67]** [2.12]* [11.24]** [14.88]**
Observations 6261 6261 6261 2575 2575 2575
Number of group 2938 2938 2938 682 682 682
Table 5
Financial crisis
This table reports random effect estimates on the firm level of coefficients of the deal-level regression of the log of the size of the
loan (Loan Size), the log of the maturity of the loan (Loan Mat) and the log of the spread of the loan (Spread). All regressions include
the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI), a dummy for the purpose of the loan: Refinancing, Acquisition or General Corporate), a crisis
dummy (Crisis) with value of 1 from 1 October 2007 onwards and the interaction between HHI and Crisis. The spread regression
include the size and maturity of the loan, the number of banks in the syndicate (Number Banks Syndicate) and whether the loans is
secured (Secure) and whether the covenant mentions a senior tranche (Senior). Columns 4 to 6 include industry dummies and
additionally the size of the borrower (Firm Size), the profitability of the borrower (Profit), its leverage (Leverage) and fixed assets
proportion (Fixed). Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. The sample period is from 1998 to 2009. The robust t-statistics in
parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Variable Definition Source
A. Measures of bank market structure
HHI The sum of squares of the credit institutions' market shares, 
according to total assets
ECB
CR5 The share of the 5 largest credit institutions in total assets in 
each country
ECB
Boone indicator Measures the effect of efficiency in terms of marginal cost 
on market shares. Competition enhances the performance of 
efficient firms which will lead to higher market shares
van Leuvensteijn, 
Bikker, van Rixtel and 
Kok-Sorensen (2007)
Contestability The share of total assets of foreign branches and subsidiaries 
relative to the total assets of the whole banking sector in 
that particular country
ECB
B. Deal-specific variables
Spread The log of all fees (in basis points) over the deal reference 
margin which can be LIBOR or EURIBOR
Dealogic
Loan Size The log of Deal value in Euro million Dealogic
Loan Mat The log of Deal maturity in months Dealogic
Number Banks Syndicate Indicates the number of lenders in the syndicate Dealogic
Secured Dummy variable which has value 1 when a deal is secured Dealogic
Senior Dummy variable which has value one when the covenant 
mentions a senior tranche
Dealogic
Deal purpose dummies Dummy variables indicating whether  deals for are for 
refinancing/ acquisition/ general corporate purposes
Dealogic
C. Firm-specific variables
Firm Size Size of the firm : log of the ratio of Total assets to CPI Amadeus
Profit EBIT / Total assets Amadeus
Leverage Loans + Long term debt / Total assets Amadeus
Fixed Cash and Cash equivalent / Total assets Amadeus
Rating Borrower Dealogic
Rating missing Dummy which has the value one when the borrower has no 
rating
Dealogic
Bond Dummy indicating when a company has access to bond 
financing
Dealogic
Same Dummy indicating when the borrower and the lead lender 
have the same nationality
Amadeus + Dealogic
Appendix A
Definitions of the variables
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Variable Definition Source
D. Country-specific variables
Inflation IFS
Creditor rights An index aggregating different creditor rights. The index is 
formed by adding one when: (1) The country imposes 
restrictions such as creditors’ consent or minimum dividends 
to file for reorganization; (2) secured creditors are able to 
gain possession of their security once the reorganization 
petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (3) secured 
creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds 
that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt 
firm; and (4) the debtor does not retain the administration 
of the property pending the resolution of the reorganization. 
The index ranges from 0 to 4.
LLSV (1998)
Restrictions for going into 
reorganization
Dummy which has the value one if the reorganization 
procedure imposes restrictions such as creditors consent; 
equals 0 otherwise.
LLSV (1998)
Management does not stay Dummy which has the value 1 when an official appointed by 
the court, or by the creditors, is responsible for the 
operation of the business during reorganization. 
Equivalently, this variable equals one if the debtor does not 
retain the administration of the property pending the 
resolution of the reorganization process. Equals 0 otherwise.
LLSV (1998)
No automatic stay on 
secured assets
Dummy which has the value 1 if the reorganization 
procedure does not impose an automatic stay on the assets 
of the firm on filing the reorganization petition. Automatic 
stay prevents secured creditors from gaining possession of 
their security. Equals 0 if such a restriction does exist in the 
law.
LLSV (1998)
Secured creditors first Dummy which has the value 1 if secured creditors are ranked 
first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the 
disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm. Equals 0 if non-
secured creditors, such as the government and workers, are 
given absolute priority.
LLSV (1998)
Appendix A Continued
Definitions of the variables
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Abstract
We investigate the role of banks in the ownership structure of non-nancial rms.
Distinguishing between banks and other institutional investors as shareholders, we
examine empirically the relationship between nancial institution ownership and
the performance of the rms in which they hold equity. We control explicitly for
the capital structure decision of the rms and the ownership decision of nancial
institutions in a simultaneous equations model. Our main nding is that there is
a negative relationship between bank ownership and the market value of rms,
measured as the Tobins Q. This is in contradiction with the monitoring hypothesis.
Key words: Financial institution ownership, Firm value
JEL classication: G32, G20
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1 Introduction
We examine the relationship between bank versus institutional investors sharehold-
ings on the performance of the rms in which they hold nancial claims. The role of
banks as shareholders of non-nancial rms remains an unresolved issue in the corporate
governance literature. Over the last decades, the issue has become even more relevant
given the fact that institutional investors other than banks have gained a more promi-
nent role as the major class of shareholders in, mainly listed, rms (IMF (2005)). Since
these institutional investors only act as shareholders, we can compare the e¤ectiveness
of banks to institutional shareholders as corporate monitors. The results should also be
informative for the debate about the optimal role of banks in the economy. Following
the nancial crisis of 2007-9, regulators have a tendency to force banks to (re)focus on
their traditional role as nancial intermediaries. The question is whether or not banks
still add value by acting as shareholders of non-nancial rms, next to their role as
lenders.
Banks can hold both debt and equity in corporations. This combination may lead
to an information advantage and give banks additional power in the disciplining of
corporate management. This should support rm performance, both in the short and
the long run. However, this dual role may also entail conicts of interest as banks
may also use their power as shareholders to protect their interests as lenders, thereby
forcing corporate managers to pursue non-value-maximizing strategies. Therefore, we
attempt to explore three relationships simultaneously in our empirical setup. The most
important relationship is the link between the ownership structure of rms and their
performance, which we measure as Tobins Q. Since the ownership decision is potentially
endogenous, the second relationship explores the link between bank or institutional
investor ownership and rm-specic determinants. In their dual role of lender and owner,
banks may have the power to inuence the leverage decisions of rms. Since leverage
may serve as a disciplining device, a third association is that between the observed
leverage of a rm and its performance. In order to compare the value added of banks
to institutional investors as equity holders, we run these estimations for both types of
shareholders. Hence, we analyze the following questions: What are the determinants of
bank and institutional investor ownership in non-nancial rms? What is the e¤ect on
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the long-run corporate performance (measured as Tobins Q) of bank versus institutional
investor ownership? What are the interactions between ownership, leverage and rm
value?
Research on banks as corporate shareholders in the 1980s and 1990s mainly focused
on Germany and Japan, since these countries allowed close ties between companies and
their so-called main banks. Most of this research concluded that German and Japanese
rms beneted from the active involvement of their main bank in corporate governance
(see, e.g., Cable (1985), Gorton and Schmid (2000) and Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein
(1990)). This was part of the rationale for the deregulation of the banking systems in
Europe. However, recent evidence seems to indicate that banks no longer add value as
corporate shareholders. Ferreira and Matos (2008) nd that independent institutional
investors add value whereas banks have no e¤ect on rm value. They suggest that banks
are poor monitors because they are too close to corporate management. Barucci and
Mattesini (2008) nd that Italian banks become shareholders to induce companies to
undertake actions that would maximize the probability of debt repayment and not to
optimize rm value. Finally, Dittmann, Maug and Schneider (2010) nd little support
that bankers on the board of German rms act as monitors of corporate management
and nd that they cause a decline in the valuation of non-nancial rms as these bankers
successfully promote their employers business.
We contribute to this literature by focusing our empirical investigation on a cross-
section of European countries instead of one country. Europe should be a fertile ground
to investigate the value added for corporations of bank shareholdings as the Second
Banking Directive of 1989 was implemented in all EU countries by 1994. The Second
Banking Directive allows banks to act as active corporate shareholders. The directive
contains provisions allowing commercial banks to pursue strategies similar to German-
style universal banks. Banks can hold equity stakes in non-nancial rms, be it subject
to certain regulatory limits 1 . Moreover, by focusing on the core EU-15 group of coun-
tries, we ensure that relevant characteristics of the regulatory environment such as
accounting or disclosure rules are more or less homogeneous. From a theoretical view-
1 The Directive states that a bank cannot invest more than 60% of its capital in shares of
non-nancial rms and that any single investment cannot exceed the ceiling of 15% of the
banks capital.
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point we do not only explore the direct link between bank shareholdings and rm value,
but we also explicitly take the capital structure of rms into account when examining
the e¤ect of nancial institution shareholdings. In this respect we di¤er from Ferreira
and Matos (2008) by focusing on the dual role of banks as lenders and shareholders.
Finally, we do not focus on the ownership decision only, but treat it as one of the three
pillars of our empirical setup in which we link ownership, value creation and leverage.
We nd that banks and institutional investors do not di¤er with respect to the own-
ership decision. They both typically hold equity stakes in large, cash rich and widely
held rms which are moreover characterized by high dividend yield and a lower than
average stock market return volatility. Our main nding is a negative and signicant
relationship between the importance of bank shareholdings in non-nancial rms and
the value of those rms, measured as Tobins Q. Although the e¤ect is most pronounced
for banks, we also nd that non-bank institutional investor equity stakes are not asso-
ciated with higher rm valuations. An increase of bank ownership of 5.0%, leaving all
other variables at their mean, will lead to a Tobins Q reduction of 11.1%. When we
control for the capital structure of the rm, the reduction becomes as much as 26.1%.
The decrease in Tobins Q is less severe for institutional investor ownership, where an
increase of 5.0% ownership is associated with a Tobins Q reduction that ranges be-
tween 5.8% and 6.5%. The conclusion is that the involvement of nancial institutions
in the ownership structure of rms fails to create shareholder value. This evidence is
not compatible with the monitoring hypothesis and raises the question whether the
current regulatory framework is optimal. Finally, although the presence of banks in the
ownership structure of rms is associated with higher levels of leverage, this feature
does not appear to function as an e¤ective disciplining device for managers.
In the next section we briey review parts of the relevant literature to motivate our
choice of the empirical setup. In section 3, we present the data on listed non-nancial
rms, focusing on their ownership structure. In section 4 we empirically examine the
determinants of bank ownership and the impact of bank versus institutional investor
ownership on rm value and leverage. After conducting a range of robustness checks,
we conclude in Section 5.
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2 Literature and hypotheses
Whywould banks and institutional investors acquire ownership stakes in non-nancial
corporations? What is the e¤ect of their involvement in corporate governance on the
performance of the rms? How does the capital structure of a rm inuence the im-
pact of shareholders on corporate performance? Regarding the rst issue, some studies
investigate the e¤ect of the regulatory environment on bank shareholdings, since this
may determine the e¤ect that banks can have on corporate decisions. In this category
of research, Li, Moshirian, Kien Pham and Zein (2006) show that di¤erences in macro
governance characteristics substantially explain cross-country variation in institutional
ownership concentration. More specically, large institutional shareholdings are more
prevalent in countries with stronger shareholder and voting rights, more e¤ective le-
gal enforcement and extensive nancial disclosure. Hence, they conclude that strong
governance environments act to strengthen monitoring ability so that more nancial
institutions are encouraged to hold concentrated equity positions. Other studies focus
on the rm-specic determinants of bank shareholdings. Barucci and Mattesini (2008)
document for Italy that banks hold equity mainly in companies that are less protable,
less dynamic, hold less debt and are less tightly controlled.
The second issue is the e¤ect of bank and institutional investor shareholdings on
the value of the rm. Assuming that institutional investors have objectives similar to
other shareholders, they have an incentive to maximize shareholder value. This e¤ect is
thought to have become stronger over time since institutional investors have collectively
become the largest owners of equity. When institutional investors such as fund managers
hold equity stakes in rms, they can monitor rm management through actions ranging
from the sale of shares, the active use of voting rights or meetings with management.
The more independent they are from the rms the stronger their inuence can be.
Empirically, there is evidence for a positive role of institutional shareholders. Woidtke
(2002) shows that rm value is positively related only to ownership by private pension
funds. Gillan and Starks (2003) state that the rise of professional money managers as a
large shareholder group in companies can increase the potential for monitoring of rm
management. Cornett, Marcus, Saunders and Tehranian (2004) show that better rm
performance is associated with the presence of institutions without potential business
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relationships with the rm.
More recently, a branch of the literature examines the monitoring activities of in-
stitutional investors for cross-country samples. Chen, Harford and Li (2007) nd that
banks and insurance companies are more supportive of management actions than other
types of institutional investors in anti-takeover amendment proposals. Finally, Ferreira
and Matos (2008) nd that all institutional investors have a strong preference for the
stock of large rms and rms with good governance. Firms with higher ownership by
independent institutions, with potentially fewer business ties to rms, have higher rm
valuations. They interpret this as evidence for the monitoring role of independent in-
stitutions.
For the case of bank ownership of corporations, it is important to realize that banks
can play a dual role since they can both act as lenders and as shareholders. The general
argument is that through equity investment of the bank, the opposing incentives of
shareholders and debtholders (Jensen and Meckling (1976); Myers (1977)) can be miti-
gated. However, the theoretical arguments do not lead to clear predictions. Banks may
hold equity to participate in the potential upside performance of the company, instead
of just receiving the debt payo¤. Moreover, as shareholders, banks may obtain valuable
inside information that can be useful in the allocation of credit. Finally, banks may try
to monitor the rm with the aim to reduce agency costs and protect their position as
debtholders. For example, Mahrt-Smith (2006) nds that a small equity stake held by
the bank can have a signicant and positive impact on the lending relationship. Banks
have an incentive to monitor corporations to which they lend, especially when there
is a main bank/rm relationship (Boot (2000)). This way, banks may obtain valuable
information from their involvement in lending to non-nancial rms, information that
they can use in their monitoring role as shareholder.
However, the combination of debt and equity may raise potential conicts of interest
which may weaken the e¤ectiveness of banks as monitors. Debt holders are inherently
risk averse because they face downside risk on their loans. Banks may be locked in
a lending relationship which may weaken their ability to inuence rm management.
Therefore, banks may have a disadvantage in pressuring corporate managers for changes
because it may harm their business relationships with the rm (Brickley, Lease and
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Smith (1988); Almazan, Hartzell and Starks (1995)). Moreover, if a bank holding equity
is primarily interested in ensuring the service of its outstanding debt, this could conict
with other shareholdersinterests, because banks may induce the company to undertake
more conservative policies directed towards debt repayment. In this case banks may even
become forced to extend loans to underperforming rms or restructure existing debt
at unfavorable conditions, leading to a soft budget constraint (Dewatripont and Tirole
(1994)).
Empirically, a considerable part of the literature relates to German and Japanese
banks. This is due to the institutional setting in these countries, characterized by strong
bank-rm ties in the Japanese Keiretsu and the prevalence of the main bank system
in Germany. German banks could even vote the stock they hold as custodians from
their clients. Early studies, such as Cable (1985), Gorton and Schmid (2000), Edwards
and Nibler (2000) reach benign conclusions regarding the role of banks in German cor-
porate nance. This evidence highlighted the comparative advantages of the German
bank-based system. Banks were credited with providing a long-term view on investment,
providing expertise to companies as well as improved governance. Morck, Nakamura and
Shivdasani (2000) report a nonlinear relationship between rm value and bank share-
holding for Japanese rms. At low levels of ownership, rm performance falls as bank
shareholding increases. At higher levels of bank ownership, this relationship is miti-
gated and sometimes reversed. They suggest that there are both costs and benets to
bank shareholding. More recently, however, Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) show that bank
ownership and main bank relationships have had a negative e¤ect on rm performance
in Japan during the 1990s. Barucci and Mattesini (2008) investigate large Italian rms
and nd little support for the existence of a virtuous bank/rm shareholding relation
associated with governance/monitoring arguments. Chirinko and Elston (2006) report
that bank control in Germany a¤ects company protability negatively, although sig-
nicance is rather weak. Dittmann, Maug and Schneider (2010) nd that banks that
are represented on German rms boards promote their own business as lenders and
as M&A advisors. They nd little evidence that bankers on the board act as monitors
of corporate management and even that bankers on the board cause a decline in the
valuation of non-nancial rms. These results suggest that German universal banks do
not behave di¤erently from Anglo-Saxon specialist banks in recent times. For the case
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of emerging countries, Lin Zhang and Zhu (2009) provide evidence of a negative e¤ect of
bank ownership on rm performance in China. Our empirical investigation for the EU
should be informative about these e¤ects for a large sample of listed European rms.
The third e¤ect we consider is the role of leverage. The link between bank sharehold-
ings and the degree of rm leverage is largely undisputed. In Europe, e.g., Dittmann,
Maug and Schneider (2010) report that bank lending is signicantly positively related
to the percentage of bankers on the board of German rms. Barucci and Mattesini
(2008) show that bank shareholding is signicantly correlated with the amount of debt
granted to the rm by the bank in Italy. The next question is whether the degree of
rm leverage is associated with better rm performance. This issue is part of a wider
research agenda investigating the impact of the rms capital structure on overall corpo-
rate performance. Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), and Grossman and Hart
(1982) argue that managers prefer lower nancial leverage because it reduces the risk of
bankruptcy and protects their undiversied human capital. Higher leverage may reduce
the agency problems between managers and shareholders and thereby increase rm
value by encouraging managers to act more in the interests of outside equity holders.
This mechanism should alleviate the overinvestment problem, particularly in rms with
excess free cash ow (Jensen (1986)).
Empirically, however, the evidence is mixed. McConnell and Servaes (1995) show that
capital structure matters for rm value. Lin, Zhang and Zhu (2009) document a negative
relationship between rm performance and leverage and attribute this relationship to
the soft-budget constraint in the Chinese banking sector and weak corporate governance
practices resulting from the increased borrowing. Bhagat and Bolton (2008) also nd
that higher leverage is associated with lower rm value.
Based on this literature survey, we examine the interaction between ownership, lever-
age and long-run rm performance for a large sample of listed European rms. We
rst conduct a separate analysis of the decision of banks and institutional investors to
be involved in the ownership structure of non-nancial rms. For the analysis of the
relationship between bank ownership and rm value, we set up a system of equations
that we estimate simultaneously. Since the extant empirical evidence is mixed for sam-
ples covering di¤erent countries and di¤erent sets of rms, our objective is to present a
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careful analysis of the evidence for the EU-15. The rst step is constructing a detailed
database of ownership, to which we now turn.
3 Data
The ownership data is obtained from AMADEUS, a corporate database maintained
by Bureau Van Dijk (BvD, Brussels), containing pan-European nancial data with
standardized balance sheet, income statement and ownership data for companies in
Europe with the stated objective of achieving uniformity and enabling cross-border
analysis. Several papers, such as Li, Moshirian, Kien Pham and Zein (2006), have used
ownership data from BvD 2 . We select all consolidated listed rms of the EU-15 for the
period 1997-2006. We retrieve shareholdings for listed non-nancial rms in the EU-15
for which detailed ownership data are available and exclude nancial rms from the
sample. The nal dataset contains 2,850 listed non-nancial rms from EU-15 for the
period 1997-2006, leading to 13,042 rm-year observations.
Ownership for di¤erent classes of shareholders is calculated as the sum of the per-
centage holdings in a rms stock for each year. We set ownership variables to zero if
a stock is not held by any of that particular shareholder type (Gompers and Metrick
(2001)). We focus on banks as shareholders, measured by the percentage of shares held
2 Amadeus subdivides the shareholders in di¤erent types: Bank, Employees/Managers, Finan-
cial company, Foundation/Research Institute, Individual(s) or family(ies), Industrial company,
Insurance company, Mutual & Pension fund/Trust/Nominee, Other unnamed shareholders,
Private Equity rms, Private individuals/private shareholder, Self-owned, State/Public au-
thority, Unknown, Unnamed private shareholders. Since we focus on nancial institutions and
banks in particular, we control the accuracy of these entries. First, we control whether incon-
sistencies arise in shareholder type over the years. We use the most recent shareholder type
since this proves to be the most accurate. Second, we control the names of the shareholders
for keywords (in English or languages of the sample countries) that indicate whether a share-
holder is a nancial institution (e.g., "bank," "insurance company," etc.). Finally, we use a
list of nancial institutions provided by Li et al. (2006) to cross-check the nancial institution
shareholders in our sample. They use company information databases (Lexis/Nexis and Dun
and Bradstreet), business news stories (through Factiva, Proquest, and the Google internet
search engine), the shareholdersweb sites and LionShares database constructed by FactSet
Research Systems, Inc., which collects shareholdings of more than 4,000 large investment
managers domiciled around the world.
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by banks and investment vehicles under their direct control (BANK). We compare
their inuence with that of non-bank institutional investors (INST INV ), measured
by the percentage of shares held by nancial companies, insurance companies, mutual
and pension funds, trusts and private equity rms which are not part of a bank. The
sum of BANK and INST INV is nancial institution ownership (FIN INST ). It is
important to note that BvD uses the rm as starting point for which it collects bal-
ance sheet and ownership information, where ownership is calculated as the cash ow
rights of respective shareholders. This approach di¤ers from the one used in Ferreira
and Matos (2008) who use the FactSet database to identify institutional investors share-
holdings in individual rms. Moreover, contrary to FactSet, BvD provides ownership
data of all shareholders, and has therefore information on ownership of, e.g., families
or industrial rms. Table 1, shows the summary statistics of the ownership variables.
Bank ownership is on average 5.4%, institional investors hold on average 23.4%, the
sum amounts to total nancial institution ownership of 28.8%. Family ownership is on
average 11.6%, whereas ownership by other industrial companies is 18.2%. When we
consider only observations with positive ownership, bank ownership increases to 12.4%,
nancial institution ownership to 35.6% and family ownership increases to 23.7%. The
di¤erent data collection approach in this paper, i.e. bottom up from the rms through
BvD, compared to the one used in Ferreira and Matos (2008), i.e. top down design
from FactSet, results in di¤erent percentage ownership stakes for the various share-
holder types. Shareholdings in our sample are signicantly larger than the percentages
quoted in their paper. Ferreira and Matos (2008) report nancial institution ownership
of only 7.4% of which 1.5% is held by bank trusts. The increased inuence of nancial
institutions as shareholders (IMF (2005)) might be more pronounced for the developed
countries but seems unlikely to completely explain the discrepancy between the two
datasets. Table 2 shows the distribution of nancial institution ownership and bank
ownership over the countries. The table shows that there is considerable heterogeneity
in ownership across the countries. As expected, due to its well developed nancial mar-
kets, the UK has the highest share of nancial institutions ownership, followed by the
Scandinavian countries. The highest share of bank ownership is found in Spain, followed
by Austria and Ireland. However, the highest relative share of bank ownership in total
nancial institution ownership is found in Greece and Austria with 55.7% and 51.7%,
respectively. Germany has a relative share of 37.2% which is still twice the average of
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19.2% but only the sixth highest in this ranking. A possible explanation is the change
in German tax legislation in 2001 with respect to the treatment of capital gains gener-
ated by the sale of equity stakes by banks. This has caused a decline in German banks
shareholdings. The countries with the lowest relative share of bank ownership are the
Scandinavian countries, Belgium, France and the U.K.
The summary statistics of the rm variables are presented in table 1, part B. The
data are obtained from BvD, Datastream and Worldscope using the ISIN code of the
rm as identier. To reduce the impact of outliers we winsorize the sample at the
1st and 99th percentile. We delete all observations for which one of the variables is
missing. The average Tobins Q is 1.93 with a median of 1.59. The average company
in our sample is large (e 2.29 billion, SIZE) and has leverage of 20.6% (LEV ). The
companies hold 10.5% cash & cash equivalents (CASH), have a dividend yield of 2.8%
(DY ) and a turnover of 54.4% (TURNOV ER). The rms in our sample have on average
a positive return on assets, 4.0% (ROA) and are also protable with respect to earnings
before interest and taxes, 5.0% (EBIT ). Moreover, the companies in our sample are
somewhat less closely held than the rms in Ferreira and Matos (2008), the mean for
our sample is 40.8% relative to 45.7% in theirs. The summary statistics are comparable
to the numbers reported in previous research (Rajan and Zingales (1995)). Appendix
A presents the construction of the rm-specic variables used in our empirical analysis.
In the regressions we include country-specic variables to account for any di¤erences
across countries. However, since we focus on the 15 countries of the oldEuropean
Union, we do not expect that country di¤erences will explain a lot of the cross-sectional
variation across rms. The EU has implemented a broad range of legal provisions aimed
at harmonizing the institutional and business conditions across the EU. Table 1, part
C, presents the summary statistics of the variables. The measure for the strength of
auditing and reporting standards regarding company nancial performance (AUDIT )
is obtained from the Global competitiveness report. The variable LEGAL results from
anti-director rights multiplied by the rule of law index and is obtained from La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). The nal two variables are obtained from
the Financial Development and Structure database of the World Bank. We use private
bond market capitalization to GDP as a proxy for the development of the bond market
(BOND), and a measure of stock market development (STOCK).
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4 Results
4.1 What determines nancial institution ownership?
We start with the determinants of bank ownership in non-nancial rms. All re-
gression have panel corrected standard errors allowing for heterogeneity at the rm
level (Rogers standard errors) together with year dummies and country dummies to
control for residual correlation across years and residual correlation across rms and
countries in a given year. Table 3 presents the estimates of the ownership panel re-
gressions, the rst column contains the results for banktrusts (BANK). We compare
these results with non bank ownership (INST INV ) and with nancial institutions
ownership (FIN INST ). We estimate the model in the rst three columns with OLS,
the last three columns show the results for a Tobit specication. We use as explanatory
variables rm size, market to book, turnover, dividend yield, return on equity, idiosyn-
cratic stock market risk, leverage, cash holdings, closely held shares and measures for
the importance of the bond and stock markets (Gompers and Metrick (2001); Ferreira
and Matos (2008)) 3 . Firm size, dividend yield and stock return volatility are used as
proxy for rm risk. Firm size, stock turnover and size of the stock market are related to
liquidity and transactions costs. Market to book ratios and rm size have been shown
to predict future returns (Fama and French (1992)). We nd that, irrespective of the
specication, the main common drivers of nancial institution ownership are the size of
the rm (SIZE) and whether the equity of the rm is closely held (CLOSE). The for-
mer has a positive e¤ect on ownership while nancial institutions prefer to hold equity
stakes in widely held rms. The nding that nancial institutions prefer equity hold-
ings in large rms is consistent with similar ndings, e.g., Gompers and Metrick (2001)
for the U.S., Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) for the Swedish market and Barucci
and Mattesini (2008) for Italian rms. The rationale is that nancial institutions have
concerns about liquidity and transaction costs. Financial institutions avoid investing in
closely held rms. When insiders hold dominant stakes in a rm, the outside investors
can only exert negligible inuence. However, the fact that the coe¢ cient for CLOSE
3 When we include LEGAL and AUDIT instead of country xed e¤ects, the results remain
unaltered.
96
is smaller for banks may indicate that banks act more like relationship lenders than as
monitors.
Firm ownership of all nancial institutions is positively a¤ected by the corporations
dividend yield (DY ), indicating that they act as investors seeking cash returns. However,
this e¤ect is largely driven by the institutional investors since fund managers have a
duciary obligation to their investors and hence prefer stocks paying regular dividends.
Contrary to Ferreira and Matos (2008), we nd that nancial institutions avoid rms
with relatively high levels of stock market volatility, measured as the standard deviation
of stock returns (SD). This is in line with the predictions of the "prudent man" rules
(Del Guercio (1996)). Banks however do not avoid idiosyncratic risk which suggests that
they are able to alleviate idiosyncratic rm risk by monitoring the companies. Banks are
the only shareholders who prefer stocks in rms with a relatively high level of leverage
(LEV ) which suggests complementarity between debt and equity in the case of banks
(see Barucci and Mattesini, 2008). Finally, institutional investors turn to companies in
countries with large bond and stock markets (BOND, STOCK) suggesting a preference
for liquid markets. Combined, these ndings suggest that institutional investors act as
normalstock market investors, seeking cash returns and avoiding risk, whereas the
determinants for bank ownership appear to be in line with monitoring.
4.2 E¤ect of nancial institution ownership on corporate performance
To investigate the relation between institutional ownership and rm value, we adopt
Tobins Q as a measure of rm value, calculated as the book value of total assets plus the
market value of equity minus the book value of equity divided by total assets (Gompers,
Ishii and Metrick (2003); Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004)). Since Tobins Q contains
the stock market value of the rms equity, it is a forward-looking measure of rm
performance. It captures the long-term prot potential of each rm as assessed by the
stock market. In this respect, it is a more complete indicator of company performance
than accounting prots, such as ROA, which are inherently backward looking.
We rst run regressions of a rms Tobins Q on variables associated with rm value
such as size (SIZE), leverage (LEV ), cash holdings (CASH), and median Tobins Q
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for the rms activity where the industries are specied according to the Fama/French
classication. As nancial institution ownership variables we include the ownership of
banktrusts, non-bank institutional investors and total nancial institutions. Finally, we
include the country-level variables STOCK and BOND . The ndings are reported in
table 4. Irrespective of the type of nancial institution or whether we use country xed
e¤ects or rm xed e¤ects, we nd that the coe¢ cient of nancial institutional own-
ership is negative. However, there is no signicant relationship of nancial institution
ownership with rm value, except for bank ownership (BANK) which is signicant in
the rm xed e¤ects specication.
Large and cash-rich rms have higher valuations. The individual rms Tobins Q is
positively a¤ected by the median Q in its industry. And higher leverage (LEV ) has
a negative e¤ect on Tobins Q. Table 5, column 1, shows a non parametric quantile
regression on Q. Furthermore, to alleviate measurement errors, in column 2 and 3,
we use alternative transformations of Q such as log(Q) and -1/Q (Gompers, Ishii and
Metrick (2009)). Finally, we replace Tobins Q with return on assets (ROA), column
4, as an accounting measure of corporate protability. Our results remain unaltered.
Hence, after accounting for the e¤ect of a set of standard control variables, we nd that
there is no e¤ect from nancial institution ownership both on the long-run performance
potential and on a short-term prot measure of the European listed rms in our sample.
A potential explanation for these results is the possible endogeneity of nancial in-
stitution shareholdings and the capital structure of rms. Financial institutions owner-
ship may be driven by a specic set of determinants (see Table 3). Hence, we estimate
a system of simultaneous equations which captures the drivers of rm value and the
ownership decision and which employs these interactions to determine the ultimate ef-
fect on the long-term prot potential of listed rms. To identify nancial institutional
ownership we use dividend yield (DY ), idiosyncratic risk (SD) and closely held shares
(CLOSE). The results in table 3 show that these variables drive nancial institutional
ownership but are not related to rm value. A Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogene-
ity conrms that nancial institution ownership is endogenous to rm value. For this
test we instrument nancial institutional ownership with the variables used in 3SLS to
identify nancial institutional ownership (DY , SD and CLOSE). Identication of the
leverage equation is obtained using xed assets of the company (FIXED), deprecia-
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tion (DEPR), and the median industry capital structure (LEV industry)(Baert and
Vander Vennet (2008)). Alternatively, we use the z-score of a company to intrument its
leverage (Bhagat and Bolton (2008)) 4 .
The results are presented in table 6. The e¤ect of nancial institution ownership
on Tobins Q is negative and signicant and this holds for both banks and non-bank
institutional investors. Apparently, neither of these shareholder types can exert su¢ cient
inuence to have an impact on rm performance. These ndings do not support the
monitoring hypothesis. The coe¢ cients in the ownership equation indicate that the
determinants of nancial institution ownership remain unaltered when estimated in a
system. When we consider the coe¢ cients of the Tobins Q equation, the results for
the control variables are broadly similar to the ones in table 5. Median industry Q (Q
industry), cash holdings (CASH) and the size of the rm (SIZE) display a positive
association with its market value. The book leverage variable (LEV ) has a negative
impact onQ, as in Ferreira and Matos (2008). The nding that nancial institutions add
no (market) value as shareholders suggests a lack of monitoring inuence on corporate
management and is inconsistent with any form of the monitoring hypothesis. The results
are also economic signicant as a 5.0% increase of institutional investors ownership is
associated with a 5.8% reduction of TobinQ, leaving all other variables at their mean
value. The decrease of Tobins Q associated with a 5.0% bank ownership increase is
almost twice as large (11.1%).
The results remain qualitatively unaltered in Table 7 when we use log(Q), (Part A).
These results reinforce the interpretation that not only institutional investors but also
banks lack the capacity to inuence corporate management in terms of prot generation
and stock market value creation. However, when we use ROA as dependent variable
(Table 7, Part B), the negative contribution to rm performance of nancial institutions
as shareholders doesnt hold for a short-term prot measure. Since the coe¢ cients of
the control variables are very similar they are omitted from these tables.
4 The results remain qualitatively the same and are not tabulated.
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4.3 Controlling for capital structure
A two-equation system accounts for the potential endogeneity of the ownership deci-
sion. But we argue that a more complete setup should also include an explicit modeling
of the capital structure decision. Banks can hold both debt and equity and can po-
tentially use both nancing means to inuence corporate management. Institutional
investors only hold equity and can only exert inuence as shareholders. Consequently,
in our nal empirical setup we explore three relationships simultaneously while capi-
tal structure might well be endogenous in the case of bank ownership. The rst is the
link between the ownership structure of rms and their performance, measured as the
Tobins Q. Q = f(bank ownership; LEV;X). The second is the relationship between
bank ownership and rm specic determinants. Bank ownership = f(LEV; Q; Y ).
The third association is that between the observed leverage of a rm and its ownership
structure, with a special focus on banks, since they can hold both debt and equity, LEV
= f(bank ownership;Q; Z). X, Y and Z contain the respective control variables. In
Table 8 we report the results of three-stage least squares (3SLS) regressions of a system
of simultaneous equations for Tobins Q, nancial institution ownership and leverage.
After controlling for the rms leverage decision, the ownership decision by nancial
institutions and commonly used rm- and country-specic determinants of Tobins Q,
we nd that nancial institution ownership is negatively associated with company value.
This negative market value e¤ect holds both for banks and institutional investors.
The results for the three-equation system corroborate those of the two-equation setup.
Apparently, nancial institutions treat their shareholdings in non-nancial rms as
pure investments, rather than as an instrument to inuence corporate management.
Moreover, the economic signicance increases as a 5% increase in ownership of banks
and institutional investors is associated with a Tobins Q reduction of respectively 26.1%
and 6.5%.
Again, table 9 shows that the results are robust to alternative indicators of rm
performance as the dependent variable, i.e. log(Q) (Part A) and short-term prots,
ROA, are positively inuenced by nancial institution ownership (Part B). We perform
additional robustness checks to alleviate the potential endogeneity problem by including
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the one-period lagged values of the explanatory variables. All results remain unaltered.
In fact, the nding that nancial institutions prefer shareholdings in large, cash-rich,
high dividend yield and widely held rms is even strengthened.
Furthermore, we run several robustness checks (results not shown). We split the
sample into quartiles according to the size of the rms since rm size plays an important
role both as determinant of nancial institution shareholding and as determinant of rm
performance, the results remain the same for all size quartiles. Moreover, we restrict
the sample to companies with positive protability to control for the possibility that
nancial institutions and banks in particular focus on rms in distress, to take advantage
of their monitoring ability. The results remain unaltered also in this specication. We
also rerun the specications for Germany and the U.K. separately as these countries
represent the extremes in ownership culture in Europe. Both countries give similar
results as the results of the baseline estimation. Finally, we take only rms with positive
nancial institution ownership, again the results remain unaltered.
5 Conclusions
We investigate the relationship between nancial institution ownership, corporate
leverage and the market value in a sample of listed non-nancial rms from EU-15 for
the period 1997-2006. More specically, we focus on the value added of banks versus
institutional investors in their role as shareholders on non-nancial rms. The EU is
especially well suited to examine this question since the Second Banking Directive of
1989 contains provisions allowing commercial banks to pursue strategies leading to a
German-style universal bank, including shareholdings in corporations. Banks can hold
equity stakes in non-nancial rms, be it subject to certain regulatory limits. The
early empirical evidence for Germany and Japan indicated that bank ownership was
associated positively with rm performance. Simultaneously, institutional investments
in world equity markets have grown substantially in recent decades to such a degree
that nancial institutions have emerged as the largest investor class in many countries.
Therefore, we can usefully compare the inuence of bank versus institutional investor
shareholdings on the performance of the rms in which they hold equity stakes. In our
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empirical setup we explore the relationships between ownership, corporate performance
and corporate leverage simultaneously. Since leverage may serve as a disciplining device,
we explicitly take the observed rm leverage into account. This is especially important
for bank ownership, since they can hold both debt and equity.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, we report that nancial insti-
tutions, both bank and non-banks, typically hold equity stakes in large, cash rich and
widely held rms which are moreover characterized by high dividend yield and a lower
than average stock market return volatility. The preference for dividends and low-risk
stocks is most pronounced for institutional investors. We interpret these ndings as
evidence that nancial institutions behave like typical equity investors, seeking return
rather than inuence. Second, after controlling for the capital structure decision of the
rms and the ownership decision of nancial institutions in a simultaneous equations
model, we nd that there is a negative relationship between nancial institution own-
ership and the market value of rms, measured as the Tobins Q. This negative value
e¤ect holds for banks as well as institutional investors. We nd no evidence that banks,
which can use both debt and equity as potential monitoring instruments, as well as
institutional shareholders, are e¤ective monitors of corporate management. Although
the presence of nancial institutions in the ownership structure of rms is associated
with higher levels of leverage, this feature does not appear to function as an e¤ective
disciplining device for managers. Instead we nd a negative association between lever-
age and the market value of rms. These results are in sharp contradiction with the
monitoring hypothesis and question the role of banks as shareholders. The results also
contrast with the positive e¤ects reported in early studies on bank inuence in rms,
mainly in Germany and Japan. Since our nding of a negative association between bank
shareholdings and company value for a large sample of European listed rms is com-
patible with similar ndings in other geographical areas, this calls for a reassessment
of the role of banks in corporate governance. The approach of international regulators
to stimulate commercial banks to refocus on traditional intermediation, and hence on
lending, seems warranted.
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Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Ownership variables
FIN INST Financial Institutions 13042 0.288 0.21 0.28 0 1
BANK Bank 13042 0.054 0 0.1 0 1
INST INV Institutional Investors 13042 0.234 0.16 0.25 0 1
FAM Individuals and family 13042 0.116 0 0.21 0 1
FIRM Industrial companies 13042 0.182 0.04 0.27 0 1
Firm variables
CASH Cash & Cash Equiv. 13042 0.105 0.06 0.13 0 0.82
CLOSE Closely held shares 13042 0.408 0.4 0.26 0 0.98
DEPR Depreciation 13042 0.047 0.04 0.04 0 0.28
DY Dividend Yield 13042 0.028 0.02 0.03 0 0.15
EBIT Profitability 13042 0.050 0.07 0.14 -0.95 0.34
FIXED Fixed Assets 13042 0.302 0.25 0.25 0 1
LEV Leverage 13042 0.206 0.18 0.17 0 0.8
LEV industry Leverage industry med 13042 0.181 0.17 0.08 0.05 0.38
MB Market to Book 13042 1.249 0.92 1.13 0.16 8.53
Q Q 13042 1.932 1.59 1.17 0.37 9.64
Q industry Q industry med 13042 1.647 1.57 0.3 1.22 2.86
ROA Return on Assets 12992 0.040 0.05 0.12 -0.77 0.32
ROE Return on Equity 13042 0.035 0.1 0.44 -3.23 0.86
SD Stock Return Volatility 13042 0.063 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.22
SIZE Size 13042 19.279 19.11 1.92 14.04 24.1
TURNOVER Turnover 13042 0.544 0.36 0.59 0 3.54
Country variables
BOND Bond Market Development 13042 0.302 0.2 0.21 0 1.39
STOCK Stock Market Development 13042 1.145 1.21 0.45 0.14 2.7
LEGAL Legal Regime Quality Index 13042 31.220 20 13.22 0 42.58
AUDIT Strength of Auditing 13042 5.890 6 0.38 4.4 6.2
This table reports mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and number of observations (Obs) of 
variables. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The sample period is from 1997 to 2006.
Table 1
Summary stats
Chapter 4
107
C
o
u
n
tr
y
F
IN
 I
N
S
T
B
A
N
K
IN
S
T
 I
N
V
F
IR
M
F
A
M
%
 B
a
n
k
 /
 F
IN
 
IN
S
T
A
u
st
ri
a
1
5
.1
7
.8
7
.3
1
.9
3
1
.1
5
1
.7
B
e
lg
iu
m
1
8
.8
2
.4
1
6
.4
8
.0
3
5
.1
1
2
.8
D
e
n
m
a
rk
2
4
.9
3
.4
2
1
.5
7
.2
1
6
.1
1
3
.7
F
in
la
n
d
2
1
.3
2
.6
1
8
.8
1
2
.2
1
8
.8
1
2
.2
F
ra
n
ce
1
9
.1
3
.2
1
6
.1
1
9
.9
3
0
.7
1
6
.8
G
e
rm
a
n
y
1
1
.3
4
.2
7
.1
1
4
.5
3
4
.8
3
7
.2
G
re
e
ce
7
.0
3
.9
3
.1
2
8
.9
2
3
.4
5
5
.7
Ir
e
la
n
d
2
1
.4
8
.3
1
3
.1
8
.5
1
0
.5
3
8
.8
It
a
ly
1
9
.4
4
.2
1
5
.2
1
9
.8
3
3
.3
2
1
.6
N
e
th
e
rl
a
n
d
s
2
7
.5
7
.3
2
0
.2
2
.9
1
9
.8
2
6
.5
P
o
rt
u
g
a
l
1
4
.7
8
.0
6
.7
1
.7
4
2
.9
5
4
.4
S
p
a
in
2
9
.8
1
4
.9
1
5
.0
5
.9
4
0
.2
5
0
.0
S
w
e
d
e
n
2
4
.5
5
.3
1
9
.2
1
0
.3
1
9
.7
2
1
.6
U
n
it
e
d
 K
in
g
d
o
m
3
8
.0
5
.9
3
2
.5
9
.6
7
.9
1
5
.5
T
o
ta
l
2
8
.7
5
.5
2
3
.5
1
1
.6
1
8
.2
1
9
.2
T
a
b
le
 2
T
h
is
ta
b
le
re
p
o
rt
s
o
w
n
e
rs
h
ip
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
s
o
f
fi
n
a
n
ci
a
l
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s
(F
IN
IN
S
T
),
b
a
n
k
s(
B
A
N
K
),
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
a
l
in
v
e
st
o
rs
(I
N
S
T
IN
V
),
in
d
iv
id
u
a
ls
a
n
d
fa
m
il
y
(i
e
s)
(F
A
M
)
a
n
d
in
d
u
st
ri
a
l
fi
rm
s
(F
IR
M
) 
o
v
e
r 
th
e
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s.
 T
h
e
 f
in
a
l 
co
lu
m
n
 r
e
p
o
rt
 t
h
e
 s
h
a
re
 o
f 
b
a
n
k
 o
w
n
e
rs
h
ip
 i
n
 f
in
a
n
ci
a
l 
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
a
l 
o
w
n
e
rs
h
ip
.
S
u
m
m
a
ry
 s
ta
ts
 o
w
n
e
rs
h
ip
108
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6
BANK INST INV FIN INST BANK INST INV FIN INST
SIZE 0.003 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.014
[2.86]** [2.88]** [3.59]** [7.73]** [6.86]** [8.04]**
MB -0.002 0 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.001
[1.82] [0.03] [0.52] [1.40] [0.25] [0.54]
TURNOVER 0.006 -0.009 -0.003 0.011 -0.015 -0.008
[2.54]* [1.74] [0.48] [2.86]** [2.92]** [1.35]
DY 0.107 0.516 0.581 0.193 0.634 0.669
[1.92] [4.11]** [4.23]** [2.66]** [6.44]** [6.19]**
ROE -0.004 -0.018 -0.02 -0.01 -0.023 -0.027
[1.47] [3.03]** [3.18]** [2.27]* [3.80]** [4.05]**
SD -0.02 -0.335 -0.347 -0.049 -0.442 -0.445
[0.43] [3.58]** [3.27]** [0.68] [4.53]** [4.18]**
LEV 0.024 0.008 0.029 0.039 0.008 0.03
[2.50]* [0.39] [1.24] [3.36]** [0.48] [1.67]
CASH -0.015 -0.035 -0.05 -0.039 -0.033 -0.054
[1.63] [1.24] [1.66] [2.33]* [1.50] [2.23]*
CLOSE -0.016 -0.049 -0.066 -0.079 -0.104 -0.12
[2.19]* [3.11]** [3.77]** [9.00]** [8.76]** [9.23]**
BOND 0.045 0.179 0.224 0.078 0.147 0.2
[2.02]* [4.88]** [4.99]** [2.68]** [3.46]** [4.36]**
STOCK 0.049 0.134 0.18 0.12 0.189 0.228
[5.61]** [8.09]** [9.14]** [8.63]** [9.95]** [11.03]**
year dummies 9 9 9 9 9 9
country dummies 13 13 13 13 13 13
Constant -0.018 -0.185 -0.199 -0.244 -0.391 -0.381
[0.49] [3.29]** [2.92]** [6.38]** [7.09]** [6.42]**
Observations 13042 13042 13042 13042 13042 13042
R-squared 0.11 0.22 0.23
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the annual time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of ownership
for banks (BANK), institutional investors (INST INV) and all financial institutions (FIN INST). The first three columns are
OLS, the last three use a Tobit specification. All regressions inlcude the firm-level regressors firm size (SIZE), book-to-
market (BM), turnover (TURNOVER), dividend yield (DY), return on equity (ROE), stock return volatility (SD), leverage
(LEV), cash holdings (CASH) and closely held shares (CLOSE). All regressions include the country-level regressors market
capitalization of the private bond market to GDP (BOND), market capitalization of the stock market to GDP (STOCK),
year dummies and country dummies. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. The sample period is from 1997 to
2006. The robust t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the firm-level. Coefficients significant at the 5%
level are in boldface. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 3
Determinants of financial institution ownership
OLS TOBIT
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-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q
BANK -0.161 -0.152 -0.195 -0.189
[1.31] [1.23] [1.98]* [1.93]
INST INV -0.038 -0.029 -0.033 -0.02
[0.59] [0.44] [0.58] [0.36]
FIN INST -0.047 -0.051
[0.83] [1.02]
SIZE 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.009 -0.275 -0.275 -0.275 -0.274
[0.95] [0.91] [0.97] [0.94] [5.46]** [5.45]** [5.45]** [5.45]**
LEV -1.108 -1.112 -1.109 -1.111 -1.002 -0.999 -1.001 -0.999
[12.97]** [13.01]** [12.98]** [12.99]** [7.89]** [7.87]** [7.88]** [7.87]**
CASH 2.024 2.024 2.022 2.023 0.627 0.626 0.627 0.626
[10.35]** [10.35]** [10.35]** [10.35]** [2.90]** [2.89]** [2.90]** [2.89]**
Q industry 1.087 1.088 1.086 1.087 1.148 1.148 1.147 1.147
[14.22]** [14.20]** [14.18]** [14.18]** [12.68]** [12.67]** [12.66]** [12.66]**
BOND 0.549 0.549 0.554 0.553 0.537 0.531 0.54 0.537
[2.68]** [2.70]** [2.71]** [2.71]** [2.78]** [2.76]** [2.80]** [2.79]**
STOCK 0.248 0.245 0.251 0.248 0.151 0.146 0.153 0.151
[3.13]** [3.07]** [3.14]** [3.11]** [2.04]* [1.98]* [2.06]* [2.03]*
year dummies 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
country dummies 13 13 13 13 0 0 0 0
firm dummies 0 0 0 0 2850 2850 2850 2850
Constant -0.258 -0.265 -0.262 -0.266 5.112 5.103 5.112 5.106
[1.04] [1.06] [1.05] [1.06] [5.45]** [5.44]** [5.45]** [5.45]**
Observations 13042 13042 13042 13042 13042 13042 13042 13042
R-squared 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the annual time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of Tobin’s Q.
Ownership include banktrusts (BANK), institutional investors (INST INV), both BANK and INST INV and all financial
institutions (FIN INST). Firm-level control variables include firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), cash holdings (CASH) and
European industry Tobin’s Q median according to the Fama/French classification (Q industry). All regressions include
the country-level regressors market capitalization of the private bond market to GDP (BOND), and market capitalization
of the stock market to GDP (STOCK). The first four columns have year and country fixed effects, the last four columns
have year and firm fixed effects. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. The sample period is from 1997 to 2006.
The robust t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the firm-level. Coefficients significant at the 5% level
are in boldface. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4
Institutional ownership and firm value
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-3 -1 -2 -4
Q logQ -1/Q ROA
BANK 0.007 -0.071 -0.057 -0.022
[0.14] [1.35] [1.74] [1.91]
SIZE 0.028 0.016 0.021 0.015
[10.05]** [3.97]** [7.86]** [14.36]**
LEV -0.742 -0.539 -0.326 -0.107
[23.58]** [15.05]** [15.23]** [10.35]**
CASH 1.172 0.742 0.297 -0.036
[28.74]** [11.06]** [8.03]** [1.58]
Q industry 0.834
[28.61]**
logQ industry 0.783
[17.57]**
-1/Q industry 0.664
[11.90]**
ROA industry 0.013
[13.26]**
BOND 0.282 0.197 0.091 -0.019
[3.64]** [2.80]** [2.47]* [1.17]
STOCK 0.024 0.058 0.015 0.026
[0.66] [2.02]* [0.93] [3.84]**
year dummies 9 9 9 9
country dummies 13 13 13 13
industry dummies 45 0 0 0
Constant -0.324 -0.164 -0.657 -0.257
[3.21]** [1.59] [8.43]** [9.17]**
Observations 13031 13021 13042 12992
R-squared 0.26 0.2 0.12
This table reports estimates of coefficients of a median regression on Q and the annual time-series cross-sectional firm-
level regression of log(Q), -1/Q and return on assets (ROA). Ownership is bank ownership (BANK). Firm-level control
variables include firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), cash holdings (CASH) and European industry Tobin’s Q / logQ/ -1/Q
and ROA median according to Fama French classification (Q industry, logQ industry, -1/Q industry and ROA industry).
All regressions include the country-level regressors market capitalization of the private bond market to GDP (BOND),
and market capitalization of the stock market to GDP (STOCK). All regressions include year and country fixed effects.
Column one is a quantile regression which includes additional industry fixed effects. The last three columns are OLS.
Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. The sample period is from 1997 to 2006. The robust t-statistics in
parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the firm-level. Coefficients significant at the 5% level are in boldface. *
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 5
Institutional ownership and firm value
Robustness
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Q BANK Q INST INV Q FIN INST
BANK -4.876
[2.03]*
INST INV -3.084
[5.19]**
FIN INST -2.192
[4.46]**
Q -0.013 -0.015 -0.03
[3.98]** [2.04]* [3.63]**
SIZE 0.032 0.005 0.033 0.007 0.037 0.012
[2.17]* [10.23]** [4.08]** [6.11]** [4.01]** [9.23]**
LEV -0.953 0.015 -1.123 -0.016 -1.057 -0.005
[10.08]** [2.11]* [15.82]** [1.00] [15.70]** [0.29]
CASH 1.878 0.016 1.785 -0.005 1.804 0.013
[20.28]** [1.50] [18.05]** [0.20] [19.19]** [0.52]
DY 0.259 0.847 0.874
[6.87]** [10.01]** [9.19]**
SD 0.095 -0.01 -0.008
[3.55]** [0.17] [0.12]
CLOSE -0.009 -0.023 -0.04
[2.19]* [3.02]** [4.47]**
Q industry 1.008 0.999 0.991
[17.97]** [22.53]** [22.29]**
AUDIT -0.127 -0.018 -0.151 -0.037 -0.156 -0.053
[2.53]* [6.51]** [3.86]** [6.10]** [3.90]** [7.83]**
LEGAL 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.004 0.008 0.004
[0.54] [4.71]** [3.68]** [14.42]** [3.01]** [14.28]**
BOND 0.055 0.012 0.411 0.133 0.318 0.143
[0.81] [2.14]* [3.98]** [11.16]** [3.36]** [10.70]**
STOCK 0.261 0.006 0.716 0.149 0.587 0.155
[5.35]** [1.29] [6.78]** [16.06]** [6.36]** [14.74]**
year dummies 9 9 9 9 9 9
Constant 0.444 0.077 0.281 0.099 0.368 0.189
[1.66] [3.88]** [1.24] [2.30]* [1.67] [3.89]**
Observations 13042 13042 13042 13042 13042 13042
Table 6
Institutional ownership and firm value
System of ownership and firm value (Q)
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the annual time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of Tobin's Q;
and alternatively, banks (BANK) in system 1, institutional investors (INST INV) in system 2 and ownership for all
financial institutions (FIN INST) in system 3. The system of equations is estimated using three-stage least squares. Firm-
level control variables include firm size (SIZE), dividend yield (DY), stock return volatility (SD), leverage (LEV), cash
holdings (CASH), closely held shares (CLOSE), and European industry Tobin’s Q median (Q industry). All regressions
include the country-level regressors strength of auditing and reporting (AUDIT), legal regime index (LEGAL), market
capitalization of the private bond market to GDP (BOND), and market capitalization of the stock market to GDP
(STOCK). Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. The sample period is from 1997 to 2006. t-statistics are in
parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 5% level are in boldface.
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Part A
logQ BANK logQ INST INV logQ FIN INST
BANK -2.3
[2.43]*
INST INV -0.352
[1.84]
FIN INST -0.231
[1.39]
logQ -0.037 -0.048 -0.09
[4.66]** [2.74]** [4.54]**
Observations 13021 13021 13021 13021 13021 13021
Part B
ROA BANK ROA INST INV ROA FIN INST
BANK 0.055
[0.21]
INST INV 1.154
[8.94]**
FIN INST 0.833
[8.77]**
ROA -0.12 -0.566 -0.784
[1.83] [3.99]** [4.92]**
Observations 12992 12992 12992 12992 12992 12992
-3-1 -2
Table 7
Institutional ownership and firm value
System of ownership and firm value (logQ/ROA)
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the annual time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of log(Q) and
ROA ; and alternatively, banks (BANK) in system 1, institutional investors (INST INV) in system 2 and ownership for all
financial institutions (FIN INST) in system 3. The system of equations is estimated using three-stage least squares. Firm-
level and country-level control variables are omitted for brevity. Firm-level control variables include firm size (SIZE),
dividend yield (DY), stock return volatility (SD), leverage (LEV), cash holdings (CASH), closely held shares (CLOSE), and
European industry Tobin’s Q median (Q industry). All regressions include the country-level regressors strength of
auditing and reporting (AUDIT), legal regime index (LEGAL), market capitalization of the private bond market to GDP
(BOND), and market capitalization of the stock market to GDP (STOCK). Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. The
sample period is from 1997 to 2006. t-statistics are in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 5% level are in
boldface.
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System of ownership and firm value (logQ/ROA)
Variable Definition Source
FIN INST Percentage of total shareholding where shareholders are financial 
institutions
Amadeus
BANK Percentage of total shareholding where shareholders are banks or 
banktrusts
Amadeus
INST INV Percentage of total shareholding where shareholders are 
institutional investors
Amadeus
FAM Percentage of total shareholding where shareholders are 
individuals and family(ies)
Amadeus
FIRM Percentage of total shareholding where shareholders are industrial 
companies
Amadeus
B. Firm-specific variables
Q (Total assets + Market value (Datastream item MV) - Book equity) / 
Total assets
Amadeus + 
Datastream
Q industry The firm's industry median Q (using the Fama and French industry 
classification)
Amadeus + 
Datastream
SIZE Size of the firm : Ln(Total assets/ CPI) Amadeus + 
Datastream
LEV (Current liability loans + Long term debt) / Total assets Amadeus
LEV industry The firm's industry median debt ratio (using the Fama and French 
industry classification)
Amadeus
DY Dividend yield  (Datastream item DY) Datastream
ROE Return on equity  (Datastream item ROE) Datastream
ROA Return on assets (WorldScope item 08326) Worldscope
TURNOVER Annual share volume (Datastream item VO) divided by Adjusted 
shares outstanding (Datastream items NOSH/AF)
Worldscope
CLOSE Number of shares held by insiders as a proportion of the number 
of shares outstanding (WorldScope item 08021)
Worldscope
SD Standard deviation of one year of € weekly returns (Datastream 
items RI)
Datastream
CASH Cash and Cash equivalent / Total assets Amadeus
MB (Current liability loans + long term debt + market value of firm) / 
Total assets
Amadeus + 
Datastream
DEPR Depreciation / Total assets Amadeus
FIXED Fixed tangible assets / Total assets Amadeus
AUDIT Strenght of auditing and reportings standards regarding company 
financial performance
Global 
competitiveness 
report
LEGAL Anti-director rights multiplied by the rule of law index La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1998)
BOND Ratio of private domestic debt securities issued by financial 
institutions and corporations as a share of GDP
World Bank
STOCK Value of listed shares to GDP World Bank
Appendix A
Definitions of the variables
A. Ownership variables
C. Country-specific variables
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Abstract
We examine the impact of bank regulation and supervision on bank liquidity
provision. As liquidity provision is one of the pillars of banking and the banking
sector is one of the most regulated industries in the world, understanding the impact
of bank regulation on liquidity provision is very important. Our results show that
stronger bank capital oversight is associated with lower liquidity provision. While
the nancial crisis has a signicant negative impact on bank liquidity, we nd that
stricter bank regulation mitigates this negative e¤ect during crisis but more powerful
banking supervisors aggravate the negative e¤ect of the crisis.
Key words: Bank liquidity, bank regulation
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1 Introduction
We examine the impact of bank regulation and supervision on bank liquidity pro-
vision. It is understood that sound banking systems contribute to healthy economies.
Banking is undoubtedly one of the most regulated industries in the world but the e¤ect
of these regulations on bank liquidity provision is less understood. As one of the main
reasons for the existence of banks beside delegated monitoring is to provide liquidity,
it is important to understand how bank regulation and supervision a¤ects the liquidity
provision behavior of banks. Therefore, we investigate the e¤ect of bank regulation on
a specic measure of bank liquidity provision in the syndicated loan market. The new
proposed regulations 1 and regulatory bodies 2 , due to the current nancial crisis, stress
the timeliness and importance of our research question.
This paper is related to the large literature on bank liquidity. Banks exist because they
perform two central roles in the economy they create liquidity and they are delegated
monitors. While the rst theories (Bryant (1980), Diamond and Dybvig (1983)), showing
that liquidity is central to banking, focus on the liability side of banks, more recent
theories (Homström and Tirole (1998); Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002)) stress the
interaction between the asset and liability side of banks. Due to deposit insurance,
banks even have a unique hedge when the market for liquidity becomes tight (Gatev
an Strahan (2006)). The relation between bank capital and liquidity depends on the
size of the bank. Bank capital has a positive e¤ect on liquidity for large banks and
a negative e¤ect for small banks (Berger and Bouwman (2009)). Finally, banks have
an advantage in lines of credit in the syndicated loan market. This liquidity provision
is positively a¤ected by more transaction deposits and less bank capital (Gatev and
Strahan (2009)).
This research is most closely related to papers which examine the impact of bank reg-
ulation on various bank characteristics. Granting greater power to o¢ cial supervisory
and regulatory agencies to monitor and discipline banks directly doesnt improve bank-
ing performance (Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006)). Banks in countries with stricter
1 Parting shotThe Economist Oct 8th 2009
2 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/nances/docs/committees/supervision/
20090923/com2009_501_en.pdf
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capital requirement regulations and with more independent supervisors performed bet-
ter (Beltratti and Stulz (2009)). The relation between bank risk and capital regulations,
deposit insurance policies, and restrictions on bank activities depends critically on each
banks ownership structure (Laeven and Levine (2009)).
We use the database on bank regulation developed in Barth, Caprio, and Levine
(2006) to examine the e¤ect of regulation on bank liquidity provision. We dene bank
liquidity provision as the yearly total amount of new Lines of Credit to borrowers in
the syndicated loan market. We use indicators for the oversight of bank capital, power
of the regulators, restrictions on bank activities, the independence of the supervisory
authority and diversication of bank activities. When we compare the banks in the
top quartile of liquidity provision to those in the bottom quartile, the former have
weaker oversight of bank capital, more restrictions on their activities, a more powerful
and more independent supervisory authority and less diversication of bank activities
than the latter. The regressions show that stronger bank capital oversight is associated
with lower liquidity provision. This e¤ect is economically important as a bank from
the bottom quartile of capital oversight gives 17.7% more liquidity than a bank from
a country with capital restrictions from the top quartile, everything else equal. Other
bank regulation measures are insignicant. Concerning the bank characteristics, only
the share of retail deposits over total deposits has a signicant positive impact on bank
liquidity. Interestingly, the coe¢ cient is higher for lead banks than for participant bank.
The current nancial crisis raises the additional question of how bank liquidity creation
responds during crises. While the crisis has a signicant negative impact on bank liquid-
ity, we nd that stricter bank regulation mitigates this negative e¤ect during the crisis.
We nd bank regulation to have a di¤erent impact depending on the bank size where
stricter bank capital regulation improves liquidity provision for large banks. Finally, a
concentrated ownership structure attenuates the negative role of capital regulation for
participant banks.
We review the literature in the next section. The liquidity measure, bank regula-
tion measures and bank characteristics are presented in section 3. Section 4 shows the
descriptive statistics and the empirical results. Section 5 discusses the impact of the
nancial crisis and section 6 shows the robustness of the results. We conclude in section
7.
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2 Literature
Banks exist because they perform two central roles in the economy they create
liquidity and they are delegated monitors. Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) analyze the idea that liquidity creation is central to banking. These theories
argue that banks create liquidity on the balance sheet by nancing relatively illiquid
assets with relatively liquid liabilities. While these theories focus on the liability side of
banks, more recent theories stress the interaction between the asset and liability side of
banks. Holmström and Tirole (1998) and Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) suggest that
banks also create liquidity o¤ the balance sheet through loan commitments and similar
claims to liquid funds. Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002) explain how banks can fulll
the liquidity demands of both depositors and borrowers simultaneously with less costly
bu¤er stock of cash, as long as these demands are not too correlated. Gatev and Strahan
(2006) show that when there is deposit insurance, banks obtain excess liquidity from
inows into government-protected deposits during episodes of reduced market liquidity.
This excess liquidity is then channeled to the many large borrowers when they need
cash because markets are tight. Thus, deposits a¤ord banks a comparative advantage in
o¤ering liquidity insurance relative to other nancial intermediaries. Gatev and Strahan
(2009) nd commercial banks to have an advantage in lines of credit in the syndicated
loan market. Commercial banks are more likely to be a participant bank in the syndicate
of a loan that provides liquidity. They show that liquidity provision of those banks is
positively a¤ected by more transaction deposits and less bank capital
Turning to the theories on the relationship between bank capital and liquidity cre-
ation, bank capital may impede liquidity creation by making banks capital structure
less fragile (e.g., Diamond and Rajan 2000, 2001). Capital may also reduce liquidity
creation because it crowds out deposits (e.g., Gorton and Winton 2000). We call
this hypothesis the nancial fragility-crowding outhypothesis. An alternative view
related to banksrole as risk transformers is that higher capital improves banksabil-
ity to absorb risk and hence their ability to create liquidity. Liquidity creation exposes
banks to risk the greater the liquidity created, the greater is the likelihood and sever-
ity of losses associated with having to dispose of illiquid assets to meet customers
liquidity demands (Allen and Santomero 1998; Allen and Gale 2004). Capital absorbs
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risk and expands banks risk-bearing capacity (e.g., Bhattacharya and Thakor 1993;
Repullo 2004; Von Thadden 2004; Coval and Thakor 2005), so higher capital ratios
may allow banks to create more liquidity. This alternative hypothesis is called the risk
absorptionhypothesis.
Berger and Bouwman (2009) nd that the relation between bank capital and liquidity
depends on the size of the bank. They argue that the nancial fragility-crowding out
e¤ect is likely to be relatively strong for small banks because small banks deal more with
entrepreneurial-type small businesses, where close monitoring is important. A second
reason is that small banks tend to raise funds locally, so that capital may crowd out
deposits. This e¤ect is relatively weak for large banks that can more easily access funding
from capital markets. In contrast, the risk absorptione¤ect is likely to be stronger
for large banks because they are generally subject to greater regulatory scrutiny and
market discipline than small banks, which may a¤ect their capacity to absorb risk. A
nal and related reason why the crowding out e¤ect may be stronger for small banks is
that these banks fund themselves largely with deposits and capital. In contrast, large
banks also use other liabilities that are less liquid than deposits (such as subordinated
debt), suggesting that an increase in capital may lead to a drop in other liabilities rather
than deposits. They show that bank capital has a positive e¤ect on liquidity provision
for large banks and a negative e¤ect for small banks.
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006) assemble, present and summarize new data on bank
supervision and regulation across more than 150 countries. Their results question the
e¢ cacy of Basel IIs rst two pillars on capital regulations and o¢ cial supervision. They
nd that strengthening capital standards and empowering direct o¢ cial supervision of
banks does not boost bank development, improve bank e¢ ciency, or lower banking sys-
tem fragility. Overall, the results cast doubt on the view that granting greater power
to o¢ cial supervisory and regulatory agencies to monitor and discipline banks directly
will lead to improvements in banking performance and social welfare. Beltratti and
Stulz (2009) investigate whether bank performance, measured as buy-and-hold dollar
returns, is related to bank-level governance, country-level governance, country-level reg-
ulation, and bank balance sheet and protability characteristics before the crisis. Banks
in countries with stricter capital requirement regulations and with more independent su-
pervisors performed better. Though banks in countries with more powerful supervisors
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have worse stock returns, they provide some evidence that this may be because these
supervisors required banks to raise more capital during the crisis and this was costly for
shareholders. Finally, Laeven and Levine (2009) examine the interaction between bank
risk taking, their ownership structures, and national bank regulations. They show that
the relation between bank risk and capital regulations and restrictions on bank activi-
ties depends critically on each banks ownership structure, such that the actual sign of
the marginal e¤ect of regulation on risk varies with ownership concentration. Stricter
capital regulations and more stringent activity restrictions are associated with greater
risk when the bank has a su¢ ciently powerful owner, but stricter capital regulations
have the opposite e¤ect in widely held banks.
3 Data
We combine several data sources to obtain our nal dataset: the Dealogics Loan
analytics database, the Bureau van Dijks Bankscope database, and Barth, Caprio and
Levine (2006) database on banking regulation.
3.1 Liquidity provision
We use the Dealogics Loan analytics database, using deals from borrower parents
from the EU15, to identify the liquidity provision of the banks. This leaves us with
a sample of 25,295 loans. The majority of the loans (56%) in our sample consist of
multiple tranches, or facilities, ranging from 2 to 13 tranches. We construct data at
the level of the bank-year, rather than at the loan level. Dealogics Loan Analytics
starts at the beginning of the 1980s and the last loan in our sample is issued 17 Feb-
ruary 2009. However, since we are interested in the characteristics of the lenders, we
start our sample from 1990 as the Bankscope database only has data from that point
onwards. To measure the banks exposure to liquidity provision (Gatev and Strahan
(2009)), we rst compute the total amount of new lending made by each bank lender
by summing the amount committed by that lender during each year from 1994 to
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2008. The new commitments are the weighted sum of all participations in the respec-
tive type of loan using the participation of the lender in the deal as weight, New
commitmentsb;y =
P
d commitmentb;d;y  participationb;d;y. Where b stands for the
bank lender, d for each deal and y for each year. We have only for a sub-sample of
the dataset (34.86%) the participation in the syndicate of the banks. We assume for the
remaining part of the sample that each lender has an equal participation in the deal.
We then split the commitments into amounts with liquidity risk (lines of credit) and
amounts without liquidity risk (other loans). The nal measure is a ratio with lines of
credit in the nominator and both lines of credit and other loans in the denominator.
Therefore, it measures the relative importance of new lending that exposes the bank
to liquidity risk: Incremental Liquidity Exposureb;y = (New commitments on lines
of creditb;y)=(New commitments on lines of creditb;y + new commitments on term
loansb;y).
Furthermore, we split the lenders according to their role in the syndicate: lead lender
or participant lenders. This variable is constructed in a similar way to the measure of
liquidity provision for the whole sample, where for each bank we sum its total lending
in which it acts as the lead/participant lender, relative to its total new lending during
the year. Ivashina (2009) states that each syndicate has at most one lead bank. The
other leadbanks obtain this title for league purposes. Our sample contains 694 lenders
of which 180 are at least once the lead bank. Some of our banks are almost always lead
lenders while others are almost always participants. In general, participants provide
funds but otherwise rely on the lead lenders for negotiation and pricing of loans and,
to a certain degree, in cases of covenant violations or default. Lead lenders therefore
must account not only for risk management concerns associated with loan funding, but
also with their ability to understand the borrower and to monitor over the life of the
loan. Therefore, risk-management considerations - such as the advantage of transaction
deposits - may matter more for passive participants compared to lead arrangers. Alter-
natively, the lead bank may favor the advantage of transaction deposits even more for
liquidity-risk management as this bank has to take into account the potential risks that
the participants cannot fulll their commitments regarding the credit line.
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3.2 Regulation
To test the impact of bank regulation on bank liquidity, we use the indices of Barth,
Caprio, and Levine (2006). These indices are as follows, where higher values represent
more:
a. Capital, an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital, including indicators for
whether the sources of funds that count as regulatory capital can include assets other
than cash and government securities, and whether authorities verify the source of
capital;
b. O¢ cial, an index of the power of the commercial bank supervisory agency, including
elements like the rights of the supervisor to meet with and demand information from
auditors, to force a bank to change the internal organizational structure, to supersede
the rights of shareholders, and to intervene in a bank;
c. Restrict, an index of regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks, consisting, for
example, of limitations in the ability of banks to engage in securities market activities,
insurance activities, real estate activities, and to own non-nancial rms;
d. Independence, an index of the independence of the supervisory authority, measur-
ing the degree to which the supervisory authority is independent from the rest of
the government and the degree to which the supervisory authority is shielded from
lawsuits by banks and other parties.
e. Diversication, an index indicating whether there are explicit, veriable, quantiable
guidelines for asset diversication, and banks are allowed to make loans abroad.
3.3 Bank characteristics
For control variables, we merge the bank-year aggregated Dealogic data to Bankscope
from the end of the previous year. The banks come from 46 countries from all over the
world. The bank characteristics include:Retail Depositsb;y = Customer depositsb;y=Total
depositsb;y; Depositsb;y = Total depositsb;y=Total assetsb;y; Bank sizeb;y = Log of
(Total assetsb;y=CPIc;y); Capital ratiob;y = Book value of equityb;y=Total assetsb;y
and Marketable Securitiesb;y = (Due from other Banksb;y + Treasury Billsb;y +
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CDsb;y+Cash and due from Banksb;y+Commercial Paperb;y)=Total assetsb;y where
c stands for country. After combining the two datasets we are left with an unbalanced
panel spanning 1994 to 2008, with bank-year as the unit of observation. The nal sam-
ple includes about 100 banks per year or between 1500 bank-year observations when
we use the known share of the bank and 2168 bank-year observations when we assume
that all banks hold an equal share in the loan.
4 Results
In this section, we rst show the summary statistics, we then compare regulation,
supervision and characteristics of banks having the lowest liquidity provision (bottom
quartile) to the banks that have the highest liquidity provision (top quartile). Finally, we
regress these variables on liquidity provision to evaluate the relation between regulatory
environment, bank characteristics and liquidity provision.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the bank-year level data. We nd that liquidity
provision equals 41% for the average bank in a given year using the known participation
of the banks. Table 1 also reports summary statistics for the lead share and participant
for each bank-year. The measure equals 39.1% for lead banks and 42.0% for participant
banks. When we use all observations and assume that banks have an equal share, the
liquidity provision is 37.0%, and lead and participant provision is very similar with
36.8% for lead banks and 37.4% for participant banks. The bank regulation measures,
from 46 countries, vary considerably over the sample. Of all lenders, 60% is from the
EU15. Total deposits are 70.3% of total assets on average and of these total deposits
73.1% are retail deposits. The average bank is large (e 856.78 billion) and has a capital
ratio of 7.6%.
Table 2 divides the sample into the top and bottom quartiles of liquidity provision
for the whole sample, for the lead banks and for the participant banks. The bottom-
provision quartile has no liquidity provision; in contrast, the top-provision quartile has
an average liquidity provision of 77% for the whole sample and the lead banks, while it
is 78% for the participant banks. For the whole sample, all bank regulation measures are
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signicantly di¤erent except Diversification. Banks which have no liquidity provision
come from countries with less restrictions on bank activities, less powerful supervisors
and less independent supervisors, with stronger oversight of bank capital, and higher
diversication. These results carry over for the participant banks where Independence
and Diversification are not signicantly di¤erent. Finally, the di¤erence for the lead
banks relative to the whole sample is the insignicance of Capital and Independence
and lead banks with no liquidity provision have lower diversication regulation. Turning
to bank characteristics we nd that the banks with no liquidity provision are smaller
banks. We see that the highest-exposed banks have signicantly lower capital ratios
and less marketable securities, but this di¤erence is not signicant. Interestingly, the
highest-exposed banks have relatively less total deposits but a higher share of their
deposits is retail deposits.
To link bank dominance in lending on lines of credit to their access to transaction
deposits, we now test how bank portfolio allocation decisions vary with the structure of
their liabilities. We are interested in whether bank regulation and in particular capital
restrictions a¤ect the comparative advantage of banks in bearing liquidity risk relative
to credit risk. We allow for clustering at the country level. All regressions include un-
reported year dummies. Since the dependent variable is measured more accurately for
banks making more loans in a given year, we weigh the observations by the number of
new loans originated. In table 3, we estimate the relation between liquidity provision
and measures of bank regulation. As the table shows, the e¤ect of capital restrictions
on the liquidity provision variable is stable when we add the additional bank regulation
measures and bank characteristics. The coe¢ cient on capital regulation equals -0.059
in the simplest model, column 1, which includes only annual time indicators. When we
add other regulatory variables in column 2, the coe¢ cient on capital regulation equals
-0.057. Adding the bank characteristics in column 3 does not change the impact of
capital restrictions. Diversification becomes signicant. We nd that there is a sig-
nicant positive relation between liquidity provision and Retail deposits. The e¤ect of
capital regulation is economically large. An increase in capital regulation from the 25th
percentile to the 75th percentile comes with an decrease in lending that exposes the
bank to liquidity risk of about 17.7%.
We re-estimate our model of liquidity provision after splitting the sample based on
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the lead-bank share. Table 3, columns 3 and 6 contain banks that act as lead banks,
while columns 4 and 7 contain banks that act as participant arrangers. The e¤ect of
capital restrictions is signicantly negative for both types of banks, where coe¢ cient
for participant banks is similar as for the whole sample and the coe¢ cient for the
lead banks is -0.081 which is signicantly larger. Again, of the bank characteristics
only Retail deposits has a positive signicant coe¢ cient. However, contrary to Gatev
and Strahan (2009) we nd that for the lead banks, the coe¢ cient on transaction
deposits equals about 0.393, about twice as large as the e¤ect for banks participating
in loan syndicates. This result questions their central argument that capital regulation
is critical for systematic liquidity risk management, which in this case is the primary
risk management objective of syndicate participant banks. This could be due to the
di¤erent denition of lead banks, where we take a more stringent denition for the lead
bank. However, when we divide the role as in Gatev and Strahan (2009), we obtain
similar results as above (unreported) where lead banks have a higher coe¢ cient on
Retail deposits than participant banks.
5 Crisis
How did bank liquidity provision respond to the current nancial crisis? The crisis can
be considered relatively exogenous (at least from the perspective of any single bank).
While the crisis did not change the measures of bank regulation for any of the a¤ected
countries during that short period, it did signicantly reduce expected rates of return on
investments. In table 4 we test whether bank regulation a¤ects bank liquidity di¤erent
during periods of crisis. We dene the period from September 2007 until the end of our
sample to be the crisis period.
The empirical strategy is to include additional interaction terms between the crisis
period and bank regulation measures to the baseline regressions reported in table 4. The
results in table 4 provide evidence that bank liquidity responds to variations in banking
regulation during the crisis period. In all models we see the negative e¤ect of the crisis
on bank liquidity. This negative impact is more pronounced for lead banks than for par-
ticipant banks. The interaction term between Capital and the crisis indicator variable
Chapter 5
131
is positive and statistically signicant at the 1% level. Moreover, the coe¢ cient on the
interaction is larger than the coe¢ cient on Capital. This suggests that during crises the
negative e¤ect of strong capital oversight is completely attenuated. The impact of the
crisis on the e¤ect of bank regulation is largest for lead banks as the coe¢ cient on the
interaction between Official and Diversification and the crisis are both signicantly
negative suggesting that, during crisis periods, more powerful bank regulation and more
diversication of bank activities are detrimental to the bank liquidity provision of lead
banks. In summary, these results indicate the response of bank liquidity to variations
in bank regulation is signicantly higher during nancial crises.
6 Robustness
We use several tests to check the robustness of our results. First, in table 5, column
1 to 3, instead of using our measure of bank capital (Capital Ratio) we use a di¤erent
measure which is directly targeted by Basel II regulation, Capital Ratio Tangible, which
is dened as (Equity - Intangible assets)/Total Liabilities. This measure of bank capital
is signicantly positive both for the whole sample and for participant banks. Moreover,
the Marketable Securities now also becomes signicant positive. Our main result, the
negative coe¢ cient on Capital remains. Second, column 4 to 6, we investigate whether
bank ownership inuences our results. Laeven and Levine (2009) show that the impact of
bank regulation is di¤erent for banks with concentrated ownership vis-à-vis banks which
are widely held, where their ndings are overturned for widely held rms. To assess the
impact of bank ownership we use the measure Independence indicatorsof Bankscope.
This measure goes from A to D where A stands for banks where none of the shareholders
has more than 25%, i.e. the bank is widely held, and D means that there is one owner
who directly owns more than 50% of the bank. We test the impact of bank ownership
by introducing a dummy for widely held banks, Widely, which we interact with our
measures of bank regulation. We corroborate the result of Laeven and Levine (2009) as
we nd that the negative e¤ect of bank capital oversight is overturned for widely held
rms. This result is driven by the participant banks as for lead banks the interaction
is insignicant. Widely held banks also witness a negative impact of diversication of
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activities. Again, this e¤ect is driven by participant banks. Third, in columns 7 to 9
of table 5, we test whether large banks are di¤erently a¤ected. Berger and Bouwman
(2009) nd that bank capital has a positive impact on bank liquidity for large banks.
To test whether large banks are di¤erent we include a dummy variable which equals 1 if
banks belong to the top quartile in terms of size, Large. We interact this dummy with
our regulation variables. The results show that for lead banks, the dummy is signicant
positive corroborating the results of Berger and Bouwman (2009). For participant banks
Large is not signicant. However, the interaction of Large with Capital is signicant
positive for participant banks suggesting that bank capital regulation has a positive
impact on bank liquidity provision for large participant banks.
Finally, in table 6, we test whether the results vary with the way we construct our
measure of liquidity provision, the dependent variable. We check two proxies to con-
struct new commitments for bank b in year y and d indexes new loans:
(1) New commitmentsb;y =
P
d commitmentb;d;y  (1=Nb;d;y)
(2) New commitmentsb;y =
P
d commitmentb;d;y maturityi;j;t  (1=Nb;d;y)
As noted, the numerator of our liquidity measure includes commitments on just
lines of credit, whereas the denominator includes commitments for all types of new
loans. Since each banks actual share of funding at origination is missing for a large
number of observations (more than 50%), we construct a parallel measure using all
of the data in which each banks share is assumed to equal 1/number of participants
(Nb;d;y). The other measure weights the commitment amounts by the maturity of the
loan. Banks with tighter bank capital regulations expose themselves to less liquidity
risk in subsequent lending relative to other banks across the two measures irrespective
of the bank role. Coe¢ cient magnitudes are smaller when we use all loans to build
the dependent variable. This di¤erence makes sense because the specication implicitly
gives more weight to participant banks relative to lead banks (lead-bank share averages
around 35%, compared to about 8% for participants), and the relationships that we
estimate are stronger for lead banks. Magnitudes are not a¤ected by whether or not we
weight commitments by maturity.
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7 Conclusion
Some countries have stricter bank regulations than other countries. Besides delegated
monitoring, the main role of the banking sector is liquidity provisioning to rms. We
examine whether di¤erences in bank regulation and supervision a¤ect bank liquidity
provision with a large sample of banks from 46 countries during the 1994 to 2008 pe-
riod. When we compare the banks in the top quartile of liquidity provision to those
in the bottom quartile, the banks with highest liquidity provision have weaker over-
sight of bank capital, more restrictions on their activities, a more powerful and more
independent supervisory authority and less diversication of bank activities. The main
result supports the view that stronger bank capital oversight is associated with lower
liquidity provision. This e¤ect is economically important as a bank from the bottom
quartile of capital oversight gives 17.7% more liquidity than a bank from a country
with capital restrictions from the top quartile, everything else equal. The current nan-
cial crisis raises the additional question of how bank liquidity creation responds during
crises. While the crisis has a signicant negative impact on bank liquidity, we nd that
stricter bank regulation mitigates this negative e¤ect during crisis and more powerful
banking supervisors intensify the negative e¤ect of the crisis. We nd a di¤erent e¤ect
of bank regulation for large banks where stricter bank capital regulation improves liq-
uidity provision. Finally, we nd that for widely held participant banks the negative
role of capital regulation is attenuated.
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-1 -2 -5 -3 -4 -6 -7
ALL LEAD PART LEAD PART
Capital -0.059 -0.057 -0.052 -0.081 -0.050 -0.081 -0.045
[4.21]** [5.98]** [5.48]** [10.70]** [5.63]** [7.58]** [4.90]**
Restrictions 0.001 -0.002 -0.036 -0.001 -0.041 -0.004
[0.06] [0.12] [2.40]* [0.08] [2.78]* [0.24]
Official 0.01 -0.002 0.025 0.008 0.003 -0.005
[0.71] [0.15] [1.65] [0.65] [0.19] [0.47]
Independence 0.019 0.033 0.104 0.013 0.114 0.031
[0.40] [0.78] [1.73]+ [0.27] [1.92]+ [0.73]
Diversification -0.06 -0.092 -0.002 -0.065 -0.024 -0.095
[1.65] [2.45]* [0.04] [1.88]+ [0.38] [2.55]*
Retail Deposits 0.217 0.393 0.211
[3.75]** [3.64]** [3.62]**
Bank Size 0.014 0.009 0.018
[1.53] [1.03] [1.61]
Total Deposits -0.143 -0.12 -0.137
[1.68] [0.60] [1.55]
Capital Ratio 0.005 -0.002 0.006
[1.62] [0.27] [1.57]
Marketable Securities 0.194 0.014 0.216
[1.08] [0.07] [1.20]
year dummies 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Constant 1.063 0.645 0.553 0.782 1.031 0.81 0.956
[14.30]** [3.46]** [3.48]** [3.19]** [5.94]** [3.21]** [5.38]**
Observations 1528 1500 1500 355 1487 355 1487
R-squared 0.3 0.32 0.36 0.28 0.27 0.31 0.32
Table 3
Baseline regression
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the bank-level regression. The dependent variable is bank liquidity
exposure of the whole sample (ALL), the lead banks (LEAD) and the participant bank (PART). The regressors are
oversight of bank capital (Capital), restrictions on bank activity (Restrictions), how powerful bank regulation is (Official),
how independent bank regulation is (Independence) and how diversified bank activities can be (Diversification). The
bank characteristics are the share of retail deposits of total deposits (Retail Deposits), the size of bank (Bank Size), the
share of total deposits to total assets (Total Deposits), bank book equity over total assets (Capital Ratio) and the share
of marketable securities over total assets (Marketable Securities). Each model includes year dummies. The sample
period is from 1994 to 2008. The robust t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. +
significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6
Capital -0.066 -0.064 -0.09 -0.094 -0.058 -0.056
[6.75]** [5.89]** [10.73]** [8.36]** [6.48]** [5.46]**
Restrictions -0.0002 -0.002 -0.036 -0.042 -0.003 -0.004
[0.01] [0.14] [2.55]* [2.96]** [0.15] [0.25]
Official 0.015 0.005 0.03 0.01 0.012 0
[1.02] [0.36] [2.04]+ [0.64] [0.94] [0.04]
Independence 0.022 0.03 0.099 0.096 0.017 0.029
[0.43] [0.62] [1.62] [1.49] [0.35] [0.62]
Diversification -0.053 -0.076 0.007 0.002 -0.061 -0.083
[1.39] [1.77]+ [0.15] [0.04] [1.68]+ [1.95]+
Retail Deposits 0.197 0.401 0.193
[3.28]** [3.62]** [3.17]**
Bank Size 0.011 0.003 0.015
[1.21] [0.30] [1.40]
Total Deposits -0.062 -0.047 -0.06
[0.54] [0.23] [0.51]
Capital Ratio 0.091 -0.132 0.127
[0.48] [0.61] [0.76]
Marketable Securities 0.003 -0.007 0.004
[0.96] [1.32] [1.08]
Crisis -0.367 -0.385 -0.417 -0.559 -0.35 -0.373
[2.20]* [2.24]* [3.73]** [6.49]** [1.84]+ [1.85]+
Capital*Crisis 0.075 0.069 0.13 0.141 0.07 0.063
[6.69]** [4.95]** [12.23]** [8.00]** [5.64]** [4.13]**
Restrictions*Crisis 0.001 -0.007 0.032 0.048 0.003 -0.006
[0.05] [0.36] [1.53] [1.96]+ [0.16] [0.24]
Official*Crisis -0.033 -0.025 -0.042 -0.024 -0.036 -0.026
[2.12]* [1.27] [3.84]** [3.40]** [2.02]* [1.18]
Independence*Crisis -0.028 -0.024 -0.002 -0.026 -0.025 -0.025
[0.74] [0.63] [0.03] [0.36] [0.65] [0.61]
Diversification*Crisis -0.011 -0.01 -0.249 -0.342 0.004 0.014
[0.20] [0.14] [5.56]** [5.07]** [0.07] [0.18]
Constant 0.927 0.855 0.77 0.814 0.954 0.854
[5.85]** [5.98]** [4.45]** [4.45]** [6.20]** [5.62]**
Observations 1500 1500 355 355 1487 1487
R-squared 0.28 0.3 0.24 0.27 0.23 0.26
ALL LEAD PART
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the bank-level regression. The dependent variable is bank liquidity
exposure of the whole sample (ALL), the lead banks (LEAD) and the participant bank (PART). The regressors are
oversight of bank capital (Capital), restrictions on bank activity (Restrictions), how powerful bank regulation is
(Official), how independent bank regulation is (Independence) and how diversified bank activities can be
(Diversification). The bank characteristics are the share of retail deposits of total deposits (Retail Deposits), the size of
bank (Bank Size), the share of total deposits to total assets (Total Deposits), bank book equity over total assets (Capital
Ratio) and the share of marketable securities over total assets (Marketable Securities). Each model includes year
dummies. The sample period is from 1994 to 2008. The robust t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at
the country-level. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6
ALL LEAD PART ALL LEAD PART
Capital -0.036 -0.063 -0.034 -0.037 -0.06 -0.034
[5.34]** [5.00]** [4.84]** [4.95]** [4.42]** [4.37]**
Restrictions -0.002 -0.032 -0.003 0.007 -0.016 0.005
[0.17] [1.77]+ [0.19] [0.54] [0.93] [0.34]
Official 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.002
[0.32] [0.37] [0.15] [0.28] [0.16] [0.29]
Independence 0.004 0.048 -0.001 -0.001 0.053 -0.009
[0.13] [0.84] [0.03] [0.02] [0.93] [0.25]
Diversification -0.096 -0.136 -0.098 -0.093 -0.125 -0.099
[3.96]** [2.40]* [3.92]** [3.54]** [2.18]* [3.55]**
Retail Deposits 0.204 0.308 0.223 0.205 0.224 0.238
[4.08]** [2.64]* [4.48]** [3.73]** [1.86]+ [4.34]**
Bank Size 0.011 0.009 0.013 0.008 0.011 0.011
[1.75]+ [1.00] [1.81]+ [1.64] [1.22] [1.91]+
Total Deposits -0.039 -0.097 -0.04 -0.029 0.03 -0.038
[0.48] [0.48] [0.51] [0.36] [0.17] [0.46]
Capital Ratio 0.466 0.998 0.485 0.418 1.038 0.445
[2.11]* [2.39]* [2.04]* [2.65]* [2.23]* [2.51]*
Marketable Securities 0.212 0.381 0.221 0.174 0.29 0.198
[1.95]+ [2.20]* [1.88]+ [1.59] [1.86]+ [1.64]
Constant 0.778 0.833 0.752 0.701 0.6 0.633
[5.96]** [3.35]** [6.36]** [5.21]** [2.59]* [5.38]**
Observations 2168 468 2158 2168 468 2158
R-squared 0.43 0.29 0.43 0.4 0.27 0.41
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the bank-level regression. The dependent variable is bank liquidity
exposure of the whole sample (ALL), the lead banks (LEAD) and the participant bank (PART). The regressors are
oversight of bank capital (Capital), restrictions on bank activity (Restrictions), how powerful bank regulation is (Official),
how independent bank regulation is (Independence) and how diversified bank activities can be (Diversification). The
bank characteristics are the share of retail deposits of total deposits (Retail Deposits), the size of bank (Bank Size), the
share of total deposits to total assets (Total Deposits), bank book equity over total assets (Capital Ratio) and the share
of marketable securities over total assets (Marketable Securities). Each model includes year dummies. The sample
period is from 1994 to 2008. The robust t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. +
significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Robustness
Table 6
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